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Summary/Résumé/Resumen 
 
Summary 
Civil society organizations in Western societies are widely reported to have significant political 
power. Policy makers increasingly emphasize the important role of such organizations as 
“equal players” in the political process, while outside institutional politics, civic advocacy 
recently regained attention through the rise of global and transnational social movements. 
 
This paper draws attention away from individual engagement in social movements and from 
single non-governmental organizations (NGOs), toward inter-organizational networks of civil 
organizations and their role in public policy processes. Taking an inter-organizational 
perspective on civic advocacy, the paper starts with a theoretical reflection on two bodies of 
literature: social movement theory, and the literature on inter-organizational networks. The 
combination of insights from these two areas builds the theoretical background for analysing 
the “network effect” for joint advocacy by civil organizations in networks. The network effect, 
as discussed here, builds on a set of propositions about how organizing in networks affects the 
network members themselves, as well as how networks change the role of civic action in the 
policy process. These propositions are presented and discussed from two different angles: 
inside and outside networks. 
 
The empirical data for the assessment of network effects derives from four civil advocacy 
networks working in the United Kingdom in the area of economic policy with implications for 
international development. The data for each case were collected by means of document 
analysis and a combination of interviews, as well as a survey including respondents from all 
four networks and representatives of their counterparts in the policy process. The presentation 
of each proposition is followed by a discussion based on the empirical data. While the 
propositions made from an “inside” perspective on the network effect are primarily discussed 
in light of the direct perceptions of network members, the paper draws upon the perceptions of 
public policy officials in order to validate the discussion of the external perspective on the 
network effect. 
 
Starting from a classic resource-based perspective on social movements, the paper discusses the 
impact of network effects on resource pooling and mobilization. Following the “exchange 
theory” proposition that networks not only facilitate exchange between different actors but also 
lead to the creation of new network-specific resources and skills, this discussion is 
complemented by an assessment of the effects of networks on inter-organizational learning and 
the building of a shared identity. The authors state that the governance of a network is critical 
for the use of these internal network effects: governance can “steer” collective action and 
facilitate strategic alignment of individual organizations. 
 
The paper then examines the potential of networks to influence their external context. It also 
looks at how joint action impacts on network members’ perceptions of political opportunities in 
the policy process; this is compared with the perceptions of actors, such as government officials, 
whom the networks engage in the policy process.  
 
The findings indicate that the network effect on civic advocacy primarily functions inside 
networks, as it changes the way network participants perceive their role in the policy process. 
By working through networks, individuals in participating NGOs can exert some additional 
influence over public policy on global inequality. However, by comparing current practice with 
the networks’ promises identified in existing studies of organizations and social movements, it 
appears that many of the potential benefits are not being systemically realized by network 
participants. Instead, participation in such networks appears as a strategy by individuals to deal 
with a lack of focus on systemic, cross-cutting issues by their NGO, rather than a 
comprehensively resourced strategy from their organization. A consequent resource scarcity 
leads to a lack of investment in network learning and strategic planning, so that these civic 
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networks do not utilize the network effect to its full extent. As a result, the impact of the 
network effect outside networks appears limited. The reasons for the limited impact identified 
in this paper were unintended consequences of organizing in networks: network activities 
appeared to be driven by governmental agendas rather than by the NGOs’ strategic goals; the 
aims of campaigns repeated existing political compromises and narratives rather than 
introducing challenging discourses; and coalition building through networks was prematurely 
curtailed. 
 
While networks could be a mechanism for empowering civic organizations within existing 
societal structures, this would likely require an enhanced effort to align participant 
organizations with network-related activities, and the involvement of more groups who shape 
inequality, as well as those who suffer from it. Consequently, the authors draw the preliminary 
conclusion that some civic networks demonstrate a potential to enhance civic advocacy in 
policy processes, yet generate concerns over legitimacy and effectiveness. They may therefore 
appear to some people as inert and elite clubs of intelligent civic professionals—“noble 
networks”. The paper explores two of these concerns with civic network advocacy in the final 
section, and recommends a shift from a “noble” to a global strategic network approach. This 
conclusion is particular to the type of civic organizations researched, and greater connections to 
other civic organizations, such as trade unions, may help address some of the challenges 
identified. 
 
The paper makes a contribution to the emerging field of critical and normative inter-
organizational relations, and identifies some key areas for further work. It will aid 
understanding of how NGOs relate to social movements through their networks at a time when 
struggles for financial justice are set to grow. 
 
Jem Bendell is associate professor, Griffith Business School in Queensland, Australia and 
director, Lifeworth. Anne Ellersiek is a PhD researcher at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, 
and a research associate at Lifeworth, working on cross-sectoral partnership and network 
projects. 
 
 
Résumé 
De l’avis de nombreux milieux, les organisations de la société civile ont un pouvoir politique 
non négligeable en Occident. De plus en plus, les décideurs politiques insistent sur l’importance 
du rôle de ces organisations dans le processus politique, dans lequel elles sont “acteurs à part 
égale”, au moment où, hors des institutions politiques, les activités citoyennes de sensibilisation 
suscitent depuis peu un regain d’intérêt avec l’essor des mouvements sociaux mondiaux et 
transnationaux. 
 
Ce document attire l’attention non pas sur l’engagement individuel dans les mouvements 
sociaux ou sur des organisations non gouvernementales isolées (ONG), mais sur les réseaux 
d’organisations citoyennes et leur rôle dans la définition des politiques publiques. Considérant 
les activités citoyennes de sensibilisation sous l’angle des relations entre les organisations, ses 
auteurs commencent par mener une réflexion théorique sur deux corps de littérature: l’une sur 
la théorie des mouvements sociaux et l’autre sur les réseaux d’organisations. Les enseignements 
conjugués de ces deux littératures constituent la toile de fond théorique sur laquelle ils 
analysent “l’effet réseau” qui se fait sentir lorsque des organisations de citoyens en réseau font 
un travail commun de sensibilisation. L’effet réseau est traité ici sous la forme d’une série de 
propositions expliquant comment le fait de s’organiser en réseau a une incidence sur les 
membres du réseau et comment les réseaux changent le rôle de l’action citoyenne dans le 
processus politique. Ces propositions sont présentées et commentées sous deux angles 
différents: de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur des réseaux.  
 
Les données empiriques qui ont servi à évaluer les effets réseau proviennent de quatre réseaux 
travaillant au Royaume-Uni pour sensibiliser les esprits à la politique économique et à ses 
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conséquences pour le développement international. Dans chaque cas, les données recueillies 
proviennent de l’analyse de documents et de divers entretiens, ainsi que d’une enquête réalisée 
auprès de représentants des quatre réseaux et de leurs homologues de la sphère politique. 
L’exposé de chaque proposition est suivi d’un commentaire qui s’appuie sur des données 
empiriques. Si les propositions faites “de l’intérieur” sur l’effet réseau sont essentiellement 
commentées à la lumière des perceptions directes des membres du réseau, les auteurs 
s’appuient sur les perceptions des responsables des politiques publiques pour valider le 
commentaire sur l’effet réseau vu de l’extérieur. 
 
Après avoir étudié les mouvements sociaux selon la démarche classique, en interrogeant la 
documentation à ce sujet, les auteurs traitent de l’impact des effets réseau sur la mise en 
commun et la mobilisation des ressources. Conformément à la “théorie des échanges”, ils 
posent que les réseaux non seulement favorisent les échanges entre différents acteurs mais 
aboutissent aussi à la création de nouveaux talents et de ressources propres aux réseaux, puis ils 
en évaluent les effets sur l’apprentissage interorganisationnel et la formation d’une identité 
commune. Ils estiment que la gouvernance joue un rôle déterminant dans l’exploitation des 
effets réseau à l’intérieur de celui-ci: elle peut “piloter” l’action collective et favoriser 
l’alignement stratégique d’organisations isolées. 
 
Les auteurs examinent ensuite la capacité des réseaux à influencer leur environnement 
extérieur. Ils étudient aussi l’incidence de l’action commune sur la manière dont les membres 
du réseau perçoivent les opportunités qui s’offrent dans le processus politique et ils comparent 
cette perception avec celle des acteurs, par exemple des hauts fonctionnaires du gouvernement, 
qui sont les interlocuteurs politiques des réseaux.  
 
Ils concluent que l’effet réseau sur les activités citoyennes de sensibilisation se fait surtout sentir 
à l’intérieur des réseaux, car il change la manière dont les participants au réseau perçoivent leur 
rôle dans le processus politique. Les réseaux permettent aux individus qui travaillent dans les 
ONG participantes d’exercer plus d’influence sur la politique publique capable d’agir sur 
l’inégalité dans le monde. Cependant, si l’on compare la pratique actuelle avec les promesses 
des réseaux telles qu'elles ressortent des études des organisations et des mouvements sociaux, 
on s’aperçoit que bien des avantages potentiels des réseaux ne sont pas exploités de manière 
systématique par ceux qui en font partie. Au contraire, la participation à ces réseaux apparaît 
davantage comme une stratégie adoptée par les individus pour compenser le manque 
d’attention portée par leur ONG aux problèmes systémiques et intersectoriels que comme une 
stratégie à laquelle les organisations consacrent toutes les ressources nécessaires. Ces ressources 
étant insuffisantes, elles n’investissent pas assez dans l’apprentissage et dans la planification 
stratégique, de sorte que ces réseaux citoyens n’exploitent pas à fond l’effet réseau. L’impact de 
l’effet réseau hors des réseaux apparaît en conséquence limité. Les auteurs l’expliquent par les 
conséquences involontaires de l’organisation en réseau: les activités des réseaux semblent régies 
davantage par les programmes gouvernementaux que par les objectifs stratégiques des ONG; 
loin de tenir un discours qui interpelle, les campagnes répètent, dans leurs buts, les compromis 
et les discours politiques ambiants; et les tentatives de coalition tournent court. 
 
Les organisations citoyennes en réseau pourraient avoir plus de poids dans les structures 
sociales en place mais elles devraient, pour cela, redoubler d’efforts pour s’aligner sur les 
activités du réseau et compter dans leurs rangs non seulement des associations de citoyens 
souffrant des inégalités, mais aussi des groupes capables d’agir sur ces inégalités. En 
conséquence, les auteurs concluent à titre préliminaire que certains réseaux présentent une 
aptitude potentielle à renforcer le poids des citoyens dans les processus politiques mais qu’ils 
suscitent des inquiétudes quant à leur légitimité et à leur efficacité. Ils peuvent donc apparaître 
aux yeux de certains comme des clubs inertes et élitistes de citoyens intelligents et 
professionnalisés—comme des “réseaux nobles”. Les auteurs approfondissent dans la dernière 
section deux des préoccupations que suscite la sensibilisation des réseaux et recommandent que 
l’approche “noble” cède la place à une démarche stratégique globale. Cette conclusion est 
particulière au type d’organisations sur lequel se sont penchés les chercheurs, et une plus 
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grande attention portée à d’autres organisations telles que les syndicats peut aider à surmonter 
certaines des difficultés relevées.   
 
Ce document apporte une contribution à un domaine nouveau, celui des relations entre les 
organisations vues sous l’angle critique et normatif, et indique des secteurs clés auxquels les 
recherches pourraient s’intéresser à l’avenir. Il devrait permettre de comprendre de quelle 
manière les ONG s’entendent avec les mouvements sociaux par l’intermédiaire de leurs réseaux 
à un moment où les luttes pour une justice financière vont grandissantes. 
 
Jem Bendell est maître de conférences à la Griffith Business School dans le Queensland, 
Australie, et directeur de Lifeworth. Anne Ellersiek est doctorante à l’Université Tilburg aux 
Pays-Bas et chargée de recherche chez Lifeworth; elle travaille sur des projets de partenariat et 
de réseau intersectoriels. 
 
 
Resumen 
Es generalmente sabido que las organizaciones de la sociedad civil en el hemisferio occidental 
tienen un grado considerable de poder político. Las instancias normativas recalcan cada vez 
más el importante papel de estas organizaciones como “actores iguales” del proceso político 
mientras que fuera del ámbito de la política institucional, las actividades de defensa y 
promoción de causas han cobrado nueva importancia en los últimos tiempos con el surgimiento 
de movimientos sociales transnacionales y mundiales. 
 
El presente documento deja de lado la participación individual en los movimientos sociales y 
las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) como entes individuales, para ocuparse de las 
redes interinstitucionales de organizaciones civiles y su función en los procesos de política 
pública. A partir de esta perspectiva interinstitucional sobre la promoción civil de causas, el 
documento parte de una reflexión teórica sobre dos corrientes de análisis: la teoría de los 
movimientos sociales y la bibliografía especializada sobre las redes interinstitucionales. La 
combinación de las perspectivas provenientes de estas dos áreas forma la base teórica para 
analizar el “efecto red” para la defensa conjunta de una causa por parte de organizaciones 
civiles que conforman una red. El efecto red, en los términos entendidos en este trabajo, se vale 
de una serie de proposiciones sobre la forma en que la organización en red afecta a los 
miembros que la componen, así como la forma en que las redes modifican el papel de la acción 
civil en el proceso de la formulación de políticas. Estas proposiciones se presentan y se 
examinan desde dos ángulos diferentes: redes internas y redes externas. 
 
Los datos empíricos utilizados para evaluar los efectos de las redes provienen de cuatro redes 
de participación civil que operan en el Reino Unido en el ámbito de la política económica con 
consecuencias para el desarrollo internacional. Los datos para cada caso se obtuvieron mediante 
el análisis de documentos, una serie de entrevistas y una encuesta a miembros de las cuatros 
redes y representantes de sus homólogos en el proceso de formulación de políticas. La 
presentación de cada proposición se complementa con un examen basado en datos empíricos. Si 
bien las proposiciones hechas desde la perspectiva “interna” sobre el efecto de las redes se 
examinan primordialmente a la luz de las percepciones directas de sus miembros, en el 
documento se recurre a las percepciones de los funcionarios encargados de las políticas públicas 
a fin de validar el análisis de la perspectiva externa sobre el efecto red. 
 
A partir de la perspectiva clásica (que se basa en los recursos) sobre los movimientos sociales, se 
estudia en este trabajo la repercusión de los efectos de las redes sobre la puesta en común y 
movilización de recursos. Con base en la proposición de la “teoría de intercambio” de que las 
redes no solo facilitan el intercambio entre distintos actores, sino que además llevan a la 
creación de nuevos recursos y aptitudes específicos de dichas redes, el análisis se complementa 
con una evaluación de los efectos de las redes sobre el aprendizaje interinstitucional y la 
conformación de una identidad compartida. Los autores sostienen que la gobernabilidad de una 
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red es fundamental para utilizar estos efectos internos de las redes: la gobernabilidad puede 
“dirigir” la acción colectiva y facilitar la alineación estratégica de las distintas organizaciones. 
 
En este trabajo, se examina el potencial de las redes de influir en su contexto externo. También 
se debate la forma en que la acción conjunta afecta las percepciones que tienen los miembros de 
las redes sobre las oportunidades políticas en el proceso de formulación de políticas; estas 
percepciones se comparan con las de otros actores, como los funcionarios públicos, con quienes 
las redes interactúan en los procesos de formulación de las políticas.  
 
Los resultados indican que el efecto red sobre las actividades civiles de promoción y defensa de 
una causa funciona principalmente al interior de las redes mismas, dado que modifica la forma 
en que los participantes de las redes perciben su función en el proceso de formular políticas. Al 
trabajar por medio de redes, las personas de las ONG participantes pueden ejercer cierta 
influencia adicional sobre la política pública relativa a la desigualdad mundial. Sin embargo, al 
comparar la práctica actual con las promesas de las redes que se desprenden de los estudios 
existentes sobre organizaciones y movimientos sociales, parecería que los participantes de las 
redes no realizaron sistemáticamente muchos de los potenciales beneficios. En su lugar, la 
participación en estas redes parece ser más una estrategia de ciertos miembros individuales 
para responder a la incapacidad de sus propias ONG para focalizar sus actividades hacia 
problemas sistémicos transversales, en lugar de ser una estrategia que sus respectivas 
organizaciones respalden con todos sus recursos. La consecuente escasez de recursos conduce a 
una falta de inversión en el aprendizaje y la planificación estratégica de las redes, lo que hace 
que estas redes civiles no puedan aprovechar a cabalidad el efecto red. En consecuencia, el 
impacto del efecto red fuera de las redes parece limitado. Las razones de este efecto limitado 
que se señala en el presente estudio fueron consecuencias no intencionales de organizarse en 
red: las actividades de las redes parecían regirse más por las agendas gubernamentales que por 
los objetivos estratégicos de las ONG; las metas de las campañas repetían los compromisos y 
discursos políticos existentes, en lugar de ofrecer alternativas; y la conformación de coaliciones 
por medio de redes fue prematuramente cercenada. 
 
Si bien las redes pudieran ser una mecanismo de empoderamiento de las organizaciones civiles 
dentro de las estructuras sociales existentes, ello probablemente requeriría de un mayor 
esfuerzo para alinear las organizaciones participantes con las actividades relacionadas con las 
redes, así como la participación de un mayor número de los grupos que dan forma a la 
desigualdad y de aquellos que sufren sus consecuencias. A la luz de lo anterior, los autores 
llegan a la conclusión preliminar de que algunas redes civiles demuestran tener el potencial 
para mejorar la defensa de causas cívicas en los procesos de formulación de políticas, pero al 
mismo tiempo arrojan dudas en cuanto a su legitimidad y eficacia. Por ello podrían parecer, a 
los ojos de ciertos sectores, agrupaciones inertes y elitescas de profesionales civiles inteligentes, 
o “redes nobles”. En la sección final del presente estudio se examinan dos de estas 
preocupaciones que surgen con las actividades de promoción de las redes civiles, y se 
recomienda cambiar del enfoque de red “noble” a un enfoque de red estratégica mundial. Esta 
conclusión se refiere especialmente al tipo de organizaciones civiles investigadas, y el 
incremento de las conexiones con otras organizaciones civiles como los sindicatos podría 
contribuir a abordar algunos de los desafíos señalados. 
 
El documento es un aporte al campo emergente de las relaciones interinstitucionales críticas y 
normativas, y en él se proponen algunas áreas clave para futuras investigaciones. Contribuirá a 
comprender mejor cómo las ONG están relacionadas con los movimientos sociales a través de 
sus redes en el momento que la lucha por justicia financiera comienza a crecer. 
 
Jem Bendell es profesor asociado de la Griffith Business School en Queensland, Australia, y 
Director de Lifeworth. Anne Ellersiek es investigadora de doctorado de la Universidad Tilburg, 
Países Bajos, e investigadora asociada de Lifeworth, donde trabaja en proyectos relativos a las 
alianzas intersectoriales y las redes. 
 
  
Introduction 
After the London bombings in July 2005, some reflected on how individuals who had never 
themselves experienced significant deprivation could be motivated to commit these attacks. 
They were the first suicide bombers to have grown up in a country that had not been occupied 
by foreign forces (Waldman 2005). In videos recorded before their deaths, they expressed a 
sense of common identity with the people they believed were oppressed by the West. Their 
conclusion was extreme and their method despicable, but it led some in Britain to recognize 
how global inequalities and injustices can create contestation and violence involving people not 
directly experiencing the associated disadvantages. 
 
Until those explosions ripped through the city, a British person’s sense of connection to those 
who suffer from global inequalities had generally led to greater social participation and 
cohesion across the United Kingdom, by inspiring people to donate time, money and prayer to 
anti-poverty groups like the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Christian 
Aid, Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid and Oxfam. Over the years these non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) had become more vocal on the structural economic and political causes 
of the poverty, inequality and injustice they were addressing, and became involved in 
discussions, campaigns and protests that led to episodes of confrontation with the British 
government and intergovernmental institutions. This entered a new phase with the Jubilee 2000 
event at the 1998 Group of 8 (G8) summit in Birmingham, which is widely seen as a key 
moment in the counter-globalization movement (Bendell 2004). Although some grassroots 
activists were so angered by police brutality and frustrated with the pace of change that they 
proposed the use of force against people and property, their voices were in the minority. The 
reality of violent confrontations in a number of European cities, alongside a changing global 
context of terrorism following the attacks on the United States on 11 September, led to a general 
rejection of violent confrontation both practically and in principle. 
 
Toward the end of the first decade of the new century, global inequality was greater than at the 
turn of the millennium, continuing deterioration over previous decades, moderated somewhat 
by rising incomes in India and China (Milanovic 2007). The richest 10 per cent of the world’s 
population receive half the world’s income (Held and Kaya 2007). The United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report 2005 reported the continual 
marginalization of low-income countries in the international trading system. Of the $9 trillion1 
that is generated from world exports, the amount that goes to sub-Saharan Africa, with a 
population of 689 million, is less that half of that which goes to Belgium, with a population of 10 
million. This skewed trading system supports sizeable profits for corporations at the top of the 
value chain, which control access to high-value markets. Thus the grounds for both social 
connection and confrontation remain, as people rally around common cause and challenge the 
status quo. As an expression and catalyst of such mobilization, NGOs in Britain have been 
working to reduce global inequalities for many decades and paying increasing attention to 
policy advocacy (Bryer and Magrath 1999; Edwards 2003). Today, non-governmental and 
community groups address every conceivable policy issue and operate in virtually every 
country as well as beyond national borders (Evans 1999). Transnational NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International, Oxfam, Greenpeace, Christian Aid, World Vision or Friends of the Earth 
(FoE), address civic claims in various national and global policy forums (Smith 2005) in an 
attempt to influence the policies and practices of states, international institutions, companies 
and customers (Hudson 2001). 
 
Practitioners and scholars alike describe “networks” of NGOs as a key mechanism for their 
advocacy on these issues. First of all, some terms need to be clarified. A social network 
describes a social structure made of nodes (which are generally individuals or organizations) 
that are tied by one or more types of interdependency, exchange or interest, such as values or 
visions, finance, knowledge or friendship (Carrington et al. 2005). Diani (2003:2) defines 
                                                          
1 All $ figures refer to US dollars. 
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networks in activism as “relationships which connect informally—i.e., without procedural 
norms or formal organizational bindings—a multiplicity of individuals and organizations, who 
share a distinctive collective identity, and interact around conflictual issues”. In describing 
networks in the context of social movements, he focuses on their informality, common identity 
and role in contestation. Baldessari and Diani further describe civic networks as “web[s] of 
collaborative ties and overlapping memberships between participatory organizations, formally 
independent of the state, acting on behalf of special, collective, and public interests” (Baldessari 
and Diani 2007:736).2  
 
The term “civic” alludes to the concept of civil society. For this paper, a civic network is 
understood as a social structure of organizations or individuals apparently working toward “a” 
common good, and connected by interdependencies or interests, such as campaign aims, 
finance, visions and values, whether recognized and formalized by participants or not. 
“Working toward a common good” is understood as efforts supporting the universal pursuit of 
people’s individual preferences in life, and typically involves people and organizations that 
seek public goals over private profits or governmental power. This is based on a normative 
concept of civil society as describing a space of progressive action, and an assumption that 
many not-for-profit organizations working on public issues such as the environment, poverty 
and human rights are constituent nodes within this space (Bendell 2006). This normative 
concept can be termed civic society, given that a generalist and non-normative view of civil 
society that includes all forms of association (from a simple choir to Al Qaeda) has become 
dominant in mainstream academia (Evans 1999). 
 
Scholars report on the impact of civic networks of NGOs in negotiations on a broad range of 
policy issues in different national, transnational or global contexts, including large dam 
campaigns in China and India (Khagram 2002), biodiversity (Dumoulin 2002), international 
election monitoring policies in South America (Santa Cruz 2004), refugee status in Asia (Kwak 
and Liu 2004), sexual harassment policies at the European Union (EU) (Zippel 2006), policies for 
sustainable tourism in South America (Rodriguez 1999), and human rights in Mexico and 
Argentina (Sikkink 1993) and Chile (Hawkins 1997). Trade and development, besides 
environmental and human rights issues, are among the most prominent policy area of such 
network engagement (Nelson 2002). Scholars report on the decisive role these networks played 
in bringing their claims about these issues, beyond national contexts, to the global policy 
agenda of international institutions such as the United Nations (Otto 1996), and the World 
Bank.3 
 
Scholars propose several reasons for the popularity of networks among NGOs. Smith (2005) 
sees an organization networking as a response to the shift in authority, from the national to the 
international or global level, which increasingly constrains the policy choices groups can take 
advantage of in a national context. A second factor she advances is a broadening of the scope of 
policy issues that such groups cover (Smith 2005). After a rapid parallel growth of the number 
of groups within more or less separately developing so-called social movement sectors, such as 
environmental policies and human rights, scholars observe an interpolation in those issue areas: 
trade and general economic policies in particular play an ever more important role in the 
advocacy work of groups in almost all these areas. In the way that governments or international 
institutions sometimes merge two departments, NGOs also have to deal with the growing 
interdependence of issues by broadening their organizational mandates. Nelson observes how 
this evolution challenges established NGOs, saying that by the late 1990s, many NGOs “had 
become engaged in a broader set of economic policy and trade issues” (Nelson 2002:378). The 
broader and constantly more complex issues require new and different political strategies 
(Nelson 2002) which do not only impact on the way NGOs approach their political 
                                                          
2 Contrary to those definitions, scholars discuss the actual “transnationality” of these networks (see, for instance, Smith 2005) and in 
how far they really can be considered as operating “outside” of institutional politics (Santa Cruz 2004). Keck and Sikkink (1998) for 
instance, argue that networks often work in close collaboration with institutional actors, hence, cannot be seen as outside of 
institutional politics.  
3 Chiriboga 2001; Fox and Brown 1998; Nelson 1996, 2002. 
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environments but also on the way they organize themselves: in networks.4 One issue is an 
increasing need of established organizations to relate to the counter-globalization (or “global 
justice”) movement, “whose political approaches differ sharply” (Nelson 2002:378) from those 
of the more established NGOs. A lack of capacity in less established groups—some of whom 
identify with counter-globalization—to effectively channel their claims and resources into the 
decisive policy context results in a gap between NGO “professionalism and populist protest” 
(Nelson 2002:362), which some suggest is addressed through networks (Risse et al. 1999). 
 
The rise of networks means that NGOs have to “relearn—even to ‘unlearn’”—previously 
gained political lessons (Nelson 2002:378). The political and institutional factors that require this 
political retooling include both the political environment and the internal restructuring 
(Rosenblatt 2004) among groups in and through networks.  
 
The responsiveness of networks to policy issues (Carpenter 2007), their impact on those (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998; Rich 1994), as well as issues and problems in the management of NGO 
networks’ relations to other actors (Schepers 2006; Tarrow 2001) and their internal governance 
and strategies,5 have received considerable attention among scholars. Based on this literature, 
one gets the impression that networks are a promising way for NGOs to become politically 
engaged. However, most of the research done is about networks and their work in different 
policy contexts, and few studies examine the networks themselves and analyse this engagement 
from the perspective of the participants. This work is an attempt to reflect upon the network-
related promises raised in the literature from the perspective of practitioners in networks, and 
those who have been affected by them. In particular this paper will discuss how network 
participants consciously seek to maximize the benefits of networks, and what this implies for 
the network participants’ awareness of, and autonomy from, social structures; the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the impacts of networks; and the implications for the effective management of 
networks. 
 
This paper presents the findings of four case studies on UK–based NGO networks engaged in 
economic policy issues in order to reduce different dimensions of global inequality. The most 
important promise of networks, based on the literature on transnational as well as general 
advocacy networks, is as a means for NGOs to influence policy processes. This paper analyses 
the four cases in terms of those promises and identifies existing gaps between theory and 
practice. It then discusses matters of effectiveness and legitimacy that impact on policy 
processes. It explains how, working through networks, NGOs are able to exert more influence 
over public policy on global inequality. However, by comparing current practice with the 
promises of networks identified in the study of organizations and social movements, the 
authors suggest that many of the potential benefits are not being systemically realized by 
network participants. This is a result of resource scarcity, which leads to a lack of investment in 
network learning and strategic planning, so civic networks are not utilizing the network effect—
as described to by various analysts—to its full extent. As a result, their impacts are often limited 
and have unintended consequences, their activities may be driven by government agendas, 
their campaign aims may repeat existing political compromises and cultural norms, and their 
coalition building may be prematurely curtailed. Consequently, these networks generate some 
concerns over legitimacy and effectiveness, appearing to some as inert and elite clubs of 
intelligent civic professionals—noble networks. The paper concludes by suggesting that such 
networks could be a mechanism for empowering agency within existing societal structures, but 
would likely require an enhanced effort to align participant organizations with network-related 
activities, and the involvement of more groups which shape inequality, as well as those who 
                                                          
4 Smith (2005) reports on a slowing in the general growth rate of transnational organizations, which she argues is a result of a change in 
the environmental mechanisms for civic advocacy. She illustrates this argument with the example of the United Nations which “opened” 
its institutional structures to national groups in 1992. Previously outstanding access positions possessed by only a few large 
transnational NGOs, hence, became weaker as more direct access had been given to national and local groups.  
5 Carpenter 2007; Chiriboga 2001; Donnelly 2002; Edwards 2003; Fabig and Boele 1999; Fox and Brown 1998; Jordan and van Tuijl 
2000; Smith 1997, 2005. 
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suffer from it. To this end the paper concludes with some recommendations for network 
participants, conveners and donors. 
Conceptual Framework, Cases and Method 
In examining how UK–based NGOs advocate for changes in corporate and governmental 
policies affecting global inequality, it was apparent that they were teaming up in groupings 
variously called coalitions, alliances, movements and, sometimes, networks. The concept of a 
network seems broad enough to encompass these diverse collections of NGOs. In contrast to 
most analyses of how NGOs work in partnerships or alliances, the field of network studies has 
an existing body of literature on how networks function and how they could function well. 
Therefore if NGOs are increasingly engaged in networks to influence public policy, it may be 
useful to draw upon this body of knowledge to understand more of the mechanisms and 
potential benefits. Consequently this study is framed by insights from scholars of social and 
activist networks. In addition, as British development and environment NGOs are ostensibly 
engaged in social change, one way of developing insight into their activities is to draw upon an 
analysis of social movements throughout history. The turn of the millennium witnessed the 
emergence of a discourse of activism that challenges global inequalities as resulting from 
economic globalization, and networks have been identified as essential to the functioning of this 
activism (Diani 2001). As we are interested in working on global inequalities, the social 
movement literature and its analysis of new global movements is a relevant conceptual context.  
 
Although this paper draws upon existing social movements theory and discussions of networks 
within that, as the focus is on networks of fairly institutionalized British NGOs, there are some 
issues in translating the insights from this existing scholarship. Many networks of NGOs do not 
primarily aim at continuous grassroots mobilization but rather focus on communication and 
information exchange between groups. Hence, they are distinct to the concept of global social 
movements. The focus of this paper neither assumes nor explores aspects of a transnational civil 
society (Keck and Sikkink 1998), or a unified notion of “movements” (O’Brien et al. 2000), but 
analyses the networks of more institutionalized groups, with a more national and technical 
policy-influencing agenda. Although we apply insights from these areas of inquiry, we move 
beyond analysis of grassroots mobilization processes that preoccupies much of the theory of 
social movements and take a more inter-organizational perspective on civic networks in the 
policy process. 
 
The cases chosen relate to different dimensions of the interface between economic policy and 
global inequality, and represent different states of networking and levels of connection to 
broader social mobilization agendas. They were chosen for these differences, so as to give a 
broader view of the issues. 
Corporate Responsibility (CORE) Coalition 
One key issue for inequality is the imbalance of power between local and national governments, 
on the one hand, and international corporations, on the other. This gives rise to a variety of 
problems. Corporations can shield themselves from the risks associated with their subsidiaries 
and suppliers and thus not be held accountable by people who might be negatively affected. 
This leads to an inequality in the realization of justice. They can move money and transfer 
prices so that they reduce their taxes paid to government, and some can even move operations 
if governments seek more tax revenues. This leads to a reduction in the state’s capacity to 
reduce inequality through welfare programmes and properly resourced regulatory institutions. 
This ability to relocate, or threaten to do so, can also lead to a downward pressure on wages and 
mechanisms that lead to better pay and conditions, such as unionism. Low wages and high 
profits compound inequality. Therefore many NGOs have pushed for greater corporate 
accountability, including new mechanisms for people to seek redress across national 
boundaries, new regulations on the accountability of directors for their companies’ impacts, and 
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greater corporate disclosure of those impacts, risks and ways that companies are seeking to 
mitigate them. In the United Kingdom the Corporate Responsibility (CORE) Coalition seeks to 
address these issues: 
 
The main themes of the Corporate Responsibility (CORE) Coalition’s work 
include: the need for greater corporate accountability of key decision makers 
in companies, the importance of openness and transparency in corporate 
activities that have an impact on a range of stakeholders, and the need for 
improved rights of redress mechanisms so those unfairly effected by 
corporate abuse can seek justice.6  
 
This CORE coalition is a semi-formal civic network which aims to mobilize the public in order 
to change corporate law in the United Kingdom. The network represents over 130 civic society 
groups, charities, campaigning organizations and unions. It also lists some businesses, academic 
institutions and members of the European Parliament as supporters. CORE is also a member of 
the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) that represents a diverse range of civic 
society organizations from across Europe campaigning for Europe-wide change to ensure 
corporate accountability. 
 
In 2007 CORE was managed by a Steering Group, comprised of seven civic society 
organizations: Action Aid, Amnesty International UK, Christian Aid, FoE, Traidcraft, War on 
Want and WWF–UK. CORE worked mostly, if not solely, on legislation. “We are calling on the 
UK Government to enact laws that will ensure making profits is done so within the context of 
businesses’ responsibilities to their stakeholders and their obligation to ensure their businesses 
are sustainable long term”.7 Until it was passed in November 2006, the Companies Law Reform 
Bill was a key focus for CORE’s campaigning, which focused on increasing directors’ duties to 
stakeholders, mandating reporting on social and environmental issues, and issues of access to 
justice. During the work on the Companies Bill, there were working groups on several topics: 
media and communications, parliamentary work and legal work. These working groups met 
regularly to discuss the campaign; all were composed, for the large part, of the staff of steering 
group members. CORE focused on letter-writing campaigns to Members of Parliament (MPs), 
and direct lobbying of politicians and civil servants, involving a number of submissions to the 
UK government and the EU.8 CORE claims to have been a major driver behind the inclusion of 
mandatory reporting and new directors’ duties in the Companies Act adopted in 2006, a 
development discussed later in reflections on policy impacts. 
Publish What You Pay (PWYP) 
Another way that international corporations influence inequality is through the financing of 
corrupt deals and paying bribes to government officials. One sector where this is a particular 
problem is the extractive industry. Research has found that international oil, gas and mining 
companies have paid billions of dollars a year to several governments in the global South, such 
as Angola and Nigeria, where few of these countries’ citizens benefited from this financial 
windfall because of government corruption and mismanagement (PWYP 2002). 
 
The Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign was launched in 2002 by the Open Society 
Institute and Global Witness with a coalition of more than 70 other civic groups. The financial 
speculator and philanthropist George Soros backed the campaign, explaining that “secrecy over 
state revenues encourages ruling elites to mismanage and misappropriate money rather than 
invest in long-term development” (PWYP 2002). Therefore the campaign aims to help citizens 
hold their governments accountable for how resource-related funds are managed and 
distributed.  
 
                                                          
6 www.corporate-responsibility.org. 
7 www.corporate-responsibility.org. 
8 www.corporate-responsibility.org. 
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The coalition argues that companies face a dilemma of wanting to act on moral grounds, but 
face the likelihood of exclusion by some governments if they do not pay bribes or publish 
details of the payments they make to governments. Therefore the coalition argues voluntary 
commitments from companies will not work, and calls for new rules on the mandatory 
disclosure of the payments made by oil, gas and mining companies to all governments for the 
extraction of natural resources.9 PWYP does not focus on specific illegal actions, as many other 
anti-corruption schemes do (such as money laundering and smuggling), but on basic financial 
transactions, in part to expose how legitimate payments may be illegitimately used and in part 
to tackle the problem at its root—for example, the flow of funds. PWYP advocate various new 
control mechanisms, including revised stock market listing rules and international accounting 
standards. These would require all payments to governments and government officials to be 
disclosed by all extractive companies (both multinational and state-owned) for every country of 
operation, with that disclosure being: 
 
 easy to understand, reliable and comprehensive; 
 easy to compare with other companies’ figures and with government revenue 
information; 
 accessible to civic society; 
 provided in local languages; and 
 provided in the local currency. 
 
The coalition makes a business case for companies to support the coalition, arguing it is in the 
long-term shareholder interest (more stable, enabling environment and sustainable 
development) if these companies operated more transparently in all countries. The coalition 
suggests that direct involvement or indirect complicity through funding conflict or supporting a 
corrupt regime “carries a number of associated credit risks for investors”. It identified 
reputational risk and the possibility of future governments, such as the one in Indonesia, 
punishing companies that funded the previous regimes (PWYP 2002). 
 
PWYP has grown to a coalition of over 300 NGOs from over 50 countries. Headquartered in the 
United Kingdom, there are also several national coalitions around the world in Australia, 
Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, France, Georgia, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Mauritania, the Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Norway and the United States. Membership of the PWYP coalition is only open to civil society 
groups, who are asked to endorse the campaign’s appeal document in writing to the PWYP 
coordinator and agree to the PWYP coalition membership principles. 
 
PWYP is widely reported as instrumental in the setup of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), launched at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in September 2002 
by the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. The EITI brings together representatives of government, 
companies and civil society, as well as the World Bank. It is a framework for discussion, and 
only involves voluntary measures by governments and corporations, encouraging governments 
to “publish what you receive”. The relationship of PWYP to EITI and respective successes and 
limitations are discussed later.  
Trade Justice Movement (TJM) 
Another aspect of economic policy that is argued by activists to affect global inequality is the 
negotiation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements (Nelson 1996). It is often argued that 
the neoliberal paradigm which dominates the negotiations of these agreements systematically 
outmanoeuvres activists’ claims for the integration of labour and human rights, and economic 
                                                          
9 www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english. 
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and environmental justice.10 This new wave of economic activism focused on economic policy is 
collectively labelled the alterglobalization movement, and is not opposed to globalization per se 
(Munck 2003), but values social and environmental above economic concerns. In their protests 
against these economic policies, activists sought to hold accountable those political actors 
operating in the subpolitics beyond the power of the (national) political system (Gorgura 2003). 
Scholars interpret protests—such as those of Seattle, Genoa, Prague and Cancún against the 
Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the G8—as efforts to 
make international institutions and governmental agencies accountable to the people they affect 
(Callinicos 2003). The operations of these institutions and of the large companies whose 
interests they serve are severely criticized on the grounds that they constitute an “unjustifiable 
legitimation deficit” (Crossley 2003:298). 
 
Making the international trading system more supportive of reducing global inequality is the 
aim of the Trade Justice Movement (TJM). The TJM, which was founded in 2000, is today a 
coalition of more than 80 civic society groups and 9 million members, mostly British—or the UK 
branches of international—NGOs.11 It includes trade unions, aid agencies, environment and 
human rights campaigns, fair trade organizations, faith and consumer groups.  
 
The TJM is concerned with the role of international economic institutions and free trade 
agreements but focuses on European and UK trade policies. For instance, its key message to the 
UK government is that it should: “Fight to ensure that governments, particularly in poor 
countries, can choose the best solutions to end poverty and protect the environment. End export 
subsidies that damage the livelihoods of poor communities around the world. Make laws that 
stop big business profiting at the expense of people and the environment”.12 
 
These broad requests translated into a number of specific calls that it considered “politically 
possible”, directed at both the United Kingdom and the EU. These include the unilateral 
cessation of agricultural export subsidies at home; removing demands from the EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) for reciprocal trade liberalization; withdrawal of requests for 
water services to be included under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 
demands that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank “stop imposing trade 
conditions on poor countries”. 
 
In line with the work of CORE, the TJM network also calls on the United Kingdom and the EU 
to enact legislation so that companies are held accountable for their social and environmental 
impacts at home and abroad, including the development of binding international regulations on 
companies, in particular, the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.13 
 
To join the TJM network, an organization must not be a political party and its trustees must 
agree to sign up to the founding statement, “For whose benefit?”, and existing members must 
not have any objections. The governing body is a board of directors, elected annually from and 
by the membership. Each TJM member organization is entitled to nominate one candidate to 
stand for election at the Annual General Meeting. In each election, every member has one vote. 
The Board appoints the TJM Planning Group which oversees all the coalition’s campaigning 
activities and strategies. The TJM has a series of working groups operating under the direction 
of the Planning Group, focusing on areas like policy, media, events and parliamentary liaison. 
 
The Trade Justice Movement is known for its tactic of public mobilization in support of its 
goals. Its Mass Lobby of Parliament in November 2005 was the largest ever such event in the 
                                                          
10 See, for instance, della Porta et al. (2006) on the Italian global justice movement or Rosenblatt (2004) on the environmental 
movement. 
11 www.tjm.org.uk. 
12 www.tjm.org.uk. 
13 www.tjm.org.uk. 
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history of modern British democracy with 375 Members of Parliament (MPs) lobbied in a single 
day. In April 2005 the coalition staged the biggest mass protest of the UK election campaign 
when over 25,000 people filled Whitehall at an all-night vigil. The TJM worked closely with 
CORE on the Companies Bill Law Reform, helping to mobilize a major letter-writing 
campaign.14 
Sakhalin Island Network 
Environmental degradation is both a key cause of poverty and part of the experience of poverty. 
Summarized by terms such as “environmental racism” (Chavis 1987), which indicates that poor 
and underprivileged groups and communities significantly bear more of the environmental 
burden of pollution and exploitation of natural resources; or in economic terms, the “resource 
curse” or the “paradox of plenty”, which indicate that countries with an abundance of natural 
resources paradoxically tend to have less economic growth than countries without. Unequal 
control over natural resources and the degradation of human rights with respect to indigenous 
populations are key dimensions to this aspect of global inequality. Local struggles are the 
primary grounds for waging numerous battles between indigenous populations, communities, 
environmental organizations, local and national governments, and extractive industries. These 
bottom-up struggles, hence, provide the foundation for the emergence of activism that takes 
action against perceived global injustices (Capek 1993:5). 
 
Since 1994, Shell has been spearheading an oil and gas extraction project in Sakhalin Island, a 
far eastern Russian territory. The Sakhalin Island Network (SIN), an informal civic network 
composed of both Russian and UK NGOs, has been campaigning against Shell, Mitsubishi, 
Mitsui and, recently, against Gazprom for their operations on the island. SIN is a heavily media-
oriented campaigning network. It claims to have contributed to the credit guarantee agencies of 
the UK government refusing to invest in the project at the end of 2006, which meant the project 
was then open to partial nationalization. 
Method 
The case studies were chosen due to their focus on different aspects of economic policy on 
global inequalities: corporate accountability, foreign direct investment and investment treaties, 
trade policy and environmental governance. They were also chosen for their different network 
forms. The CORE network is almost exclusively British, has a two-tier structure involving a 
small group of NGOs in a steering function and a broader group of supporters. It focuses on 
technical inputs to specific public policy processes, with some episodes of public mobilization 
in the form of constituents writing to their MPs. The PWYP network is more international and 
formal, with a broader membership, and mixes technical inputs with episodes of lobbying. The 
TJM is also mostly comprised of UK NGOs, and is more overtly political than either CORE or 
PWYP by requiring official commitments from trustees to a common platform, and by being 
involved in public advocacy and mass mobilizations of memberships in demonstrations. The 
Sakhalin Island Network is much more informal, with no official membership or name. It 
focuses on generating information for high-profile media stories and, subsequently, legal action 
against government agencies. All but the Sakhalin Island Network included a variety of 
environment, human rights and development NGOs, as well as faith and consumer groups. 
This selection of cases was also based on the access that the authors could secure to both sides, 
the civic networks themselves as well as the correspondent political environment in terms of 
civil servants with whom they interact. The cases were, hence, not chosen for comparative 
analysis but are intended to generate insight from a diversity of civic networks that were 
claiming at least some advocacy success. As such, our sampling strategy can be described as 
nonprobability sampling with a primary focus on the diversity of, and access to, the networks. 
 
The data generated for this paper is of four types. First, participation by one of the authors in 
the UK NGO community working on economic justice issues over a decade shaped the issues 
                                                          
14 www.tjm.org.uk. 
NOBLE NETWORKS? ADVOCACY FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE “NETWORK EFFECT” 
JEM BENDELL AND ANNEKATHRIN ELLERSIEK 
9 
that were researched. In 2006 participation in public meetings (TJM), conferences (PWYP), 
committee meetings (CORE), and liaison with network leaders (SIN and CORE), helped to 
identify topics to follow up on in the following year. This engagement in the issues being 
researched is a valid form of knowledge generation if done transparently, with an open and 
critical subjectivity, and if supplemented by additional methods (Greenwood and Levin 1998; 
Torbert 1991). 
Second, an extensive document analysis was conducted in parallel, including online materials 
from the networks, official policy documents and printed information made available by 
network members and coordinators. This material was accessed and analysed to further 
identify key topics relating to the networks’ processes and potential influence to follow up. The 
combined information was the starting point for the implementation of the study and the 
development of the survey and interview questions. 
 
Third, an online questionnaire was circulated to civic network participants, with the help of 
network coordinators, who were also asked to complete the survey. The network coordinators 
circulated the survey to British organizations that were active participants in their networks, 
totalling about 80 organizations. As the network coordinators shared the surveys with their 
participants, we did not know the exact sample size. Thirty-one respondents completed the 
survey. Another survey was sent to 15 civil servants who were identified by the networks as 
people they had engaged with, of which nine completed it. 
 
Finally, 22 in-depth interviews were conducted with civic network participants and 
coordinators, and government civil servants, including a minimum of one coordinator and civil 
servant for each network and three NGO network participants. Only a handful of people were 
unwilling or unable to offer an interview. All those who participated in our research were 
guaranteed anonymity. Additional information was gleaned from re-reading of the interview 
transcripts by our interviewees, follow-up correspondence with NGO participants and the 
media (for example, newspapers). Considering both sides of a network, the information gained 
from the responses of participants was contrasted with the perceptions on networks from the 
outside, such as civil servants and business consultants.  
 
Both sources were analysed to determine how working in networks affects the campaign’s 
content, functioning and methods of work, and subsequently, external perceptions of the 
network and its impact on policy processes and outcomes. The primary focus, however, was on 
the perceptions of network participants—on how they perceive their actions and the difficulties 
and successes they face, in light of existing insights into how organizations and networks 
function.  
The Potential and Practice of Civic Networks 
The promises associated with the network concept are numerous (Giugni 1998). Networks are 
seen to strengthen the linkages between diverse activists, and thus encourage solidarity 
(Baldessari and Diani 2007) and provide information and resource flows for powerful concerted 
action.15 When groups form a network, they may expect new attention for their claims (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998) and enlarge their support base through power in numbers (DeNardo 1986); 
single organizations, for instance, are assumed to gain higher profiles when they work through 
networks (Hudson 2001); and the political legitimacy of groups in the policy process increases 
when they work together in networks that manage to integrate the claims of different groups, 
especially those of Southern and Northern groups (Jordan and van Tuijl 2002). Further, the 
impact of networks on policy processes, agenda setting and outcomes is assumed to be higher 
than single efforts (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hudson 2001); networks are assumed to allow for a 
variety of new tactics and influence strategies that are hardly possible to apply for one group 
                                                          
15 Coleman 1988; Burt 1992, 1997; Adler and Kwon 2002. 
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alone (Jordan and van Tuijl 2000), for instance, when groups together utilize traditional and 
unorthodox or radical tactics and strategies at the same time (Schepers 2006); networks are 
expected to effectively combine these diverse resources, information, interests, tactics and 
different activist traditions and create new opportunities for collective action. 
 
The following sections contrast the potential, or promises, put forward in the literature with the 
perceptions of participants in the networks studied, and the government officials and business 
representatives engaged by them. This section is structured into two parts. The first part 
presents the results of the interviews and the survey conducted with network participants in 
order to reveal the “inside” perspective of networks. This section discusses network promises 
that refer to issues inside networks, such as the pooling of resources, the generation of new 
approaches, knowledge and identity building. Hence, initially the experience of practitioners 
stands in the foreground, also highlighting in particular the pitfalls of network organizing. The 
second part of this section takes a perspective outside networks. On the one hand, this 
perspective discusses how working in a network changes activists’ perception of their political 
environment. On the other hand, the section discusses how the network is perceived externally, 
in how far perceptions of network members are reflected in the perceptions of important actors 
in their political environment, namely, the business representatives and civil servants they are 
engaged with. 
Inside networks 
Some of the promises of networks frequently mentioned in the literature about the internal, or 
inter-organizational, agenda of networks are: increased access to information, expertise and 
financial resources; higher efficiency through multiplier effects, which increase the reach and 
impact available to member organizations, solidarity and support; increased visibility of issues 
and underrepresented groups; risk mitigation; reduced isolation and increased credibility. An 
overview of the promises made in the respective literature is provided in table 1. These 
promises will be elaborated step by step in this section. 
 
Table 1: Network promises (internal) 
Promises Source 
Networks bring additional strength for collective action through the exchange 
and pooling of resources (financial, knowledge, expertise, etc.) 
Resource mobilization theory 
Keck and Sikkink 1998 
Networks facilitate knowledge exchange, learning and the generation of new 
and creative solutions among participants 
Dumoulin 2002 
Networks enable groups to mobilize and bundle their resources strategically Keck 1998 
Networks help to build a shared collective identity among participants beyond 
conventional movement sectors 
Keck and Sikkink 1998 
Diani 2003 
Networks help to bridge the gap between Northern and Southern groups Crossley 2003 
Jordan and van Tuijl 2000 
Networks help to decentralize existing relations among NGOs Skjelsbeak, 1971; Smith 2005 
 
This section synthesizes insights on the promise of networks from literature on inter-
organizational networks and social movement theory, before reflecting on which of these 
promises resonated with the experience of the participants in the four networks studied. This is 
done in order to identify the benefits for civic networks in particular, the opportunities they 
might be missing and to identify possible limitations in existing analyses. Data from the two 
surveys are presented, and the argument is also illustrated by quotes from practitioners from 
the 23 interviews undertaken during June and July 2007 with participants in the civic networks 
and those in government with whom they engaged. Three classic concepts of social movement 
research structure the discussion: resource mobilization (internal capabilities of movements 
through which activists seek to organize), identity and learning, and network coordination and 
governance. However, unlike the mainstream of this research tradition, the focus is not on the 
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emergence of activism but on networks that have emerged from established groupings in civic 
society: civic networks. 
Resource mobilization in networks 
One area of focus for social movement scholars is how activists organize, with the term 
“mobilization structures” used to describe all those means, “informal as well as formal, through 
which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al. 2005:3). Two general 
arguments for networks from this perspective are mentioned in the literature (see Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt 2001): first, networks facilitate exchange, that makes them advantageous compared to 
hierarchical, competitive and conflictive forms of organizing (Gray 2003). Whether accurate or 
not, implicit in many peoples’ understandings of a network is that they provide network 
participants with an equal opportunity to share and receive resources, in particular knowledge 
and information, where such sharing is regarded as a positive practice. Therefore the very 
concept of a network is argued to enable exchange (Borgatti and Foster 2003). Second, through 
this increase in the flow of information between actors, networks are seen as changing the 
nature of resources relevant for political change (Fuchs 2005). Drawing on Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt’s observation that in political processes today, “[m]ore than ever before, conflicts 
revolve around ‘knowledge’ and the use of ‘soft power’” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001:218), 
Gorgura (2003) proposes that networks not only channel these resources more effectively than 
traditional forms of organizing (for example, hierarchical) but also generate new knowledge 
and resources by connecting and rewiring ever new actors in collaborative, compared to 
competitive, environments. Therefore it is argued that networks build new grounds for resource 
mobilization (Diani 2001). 
 
In the case studies, the pooling of resources was the primum mobile for organizations to join a 
network—apart from related reasons, such as facilitating inter-organizational learning and the 
exchange of experiences among members. Knowledge sharing and exchange, and the joint 
creation of new knowledge, occurred along a dimension similar to the spectrum of knowledge 
sharing in networks suggested by Hibbert and Huxham (2007). On the one hand, the exchange 
of information as material for campaigns, especially targeted toward the media, was the 
primary mode of sharing; thus members exploited the network benefit of a broad knowledge 
pool. On the other hand—although this was rare—knowledge sharing was described by the 
exchange of experiences and opening up of “institutional boxes”, as one interviewee put it. In 
this sense, knowledge and information are not only brought to the network and exchanged but 
also newly created due to the changing perspectives of network participants. Participants 
argued that the network benefit for their organizations derived from the fact that 
 
You have got different organizations with different strengths…[Some] may 
have more of a think tank or journalistic style...By working together I think 
we have been much more effective.16 
 
Different people have different connections, and get quite good intelligence of 
what’s going on. In terms of being able to do media work it was critical to 
have pictures being sent as quickly as possible, to make it a new story, a live 
issue. It was good to be able to mix our approaches, and sometimes different 
groups led on different things. 
 
In this respect, networks seem to bring together a diversity of potential sources for collective 
action. However, two limitations to this network benefit became clear from the data. The first is 
limited capacities or willingness of organizations to contribute to shared campaigns, and in 
particular to long-term developments of capacities of the network itself, in terms of its 
coordinating function. Another limitation is due to the fact that loosely coupled networks 
require coordination in order to develop such long-term visions and shared network identities 
(Crossley 2002). 
                                                          
16 Quoted text is taken from the interviews.  
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Limited capacities contributed quite narrowly to the network activities, mostly in terms of 
campaign support, and seldom beyond those more punctual joint actions. Although the 
statements in the survey turned out to be in favour of strong support and the willingness of 
members to substantially contribute to the networks, the interviews gave a more hesitant image 
of membership and resource contribution. In the survey almost half of the respondents (48 per 
cent) stated their work in the network to be a major activity requiring contact with other 
members about once a week on average, more than half of the respondents were granted a 
budget as well as a mandate for their work for the network for the upcoming year, and 88 per 
cent confirmed that it was of crucial importance to their organization that the network lasts. In 
the interviews, however, resource scarcity was seen as a major obstacle to effective network 
operations. As commonly noted in the literature, resource scarcity is an obstacle to network 
formation and maintenance (Provan and Kenis 2007). However, the case studies revealed issues 
of resource scarcity within networks of relatively resource-rich organizations, unlike in 
networks that arise from grassroots movements. The issue is not a lack of resources per se, as 
often reported by social movement scholars (Kriesi 1998), but rather the alignment of widely 
divergent and established organizational strategies and the resulting allocation of resources to 
collective efforts. In particular, large organizations with a strong campaigning background in 
other fields, such as environmental and human rights groups, reported on these struggles of 
resource allocation to the network in face of their own organizational needs and missions: “That 
really is a struggle. For all of us. A common perception I would say among pretty much all the 
members, certainly the very active ones. There’s and will always be a tension between our own 
organizational priorities and CARE’s priorities.” 
 
Hardy et al. (2006) describe this tension as inherent to collaborative processes when network 
participants are being caught between two stools: being representative of their own 
organizational interests as well as part of a network and attached to a collective issue. The 
inherent struggle that derives from this situation are described by one participant who 
coordinated the involvement of one of the larger NGOs: 
 
The issue is when we do work in alliances, there’s obviously a desire, which 
we would share, which is to get the brand of the alliance, the network, out 
there. At [name of the organisation], we were, along with other organizations, 
wanting to get PWYP’s identity out through the media. And we would 
happily do that, but we would also have a need to get our own brand out 
there as well, because that’s part of our job—so the internal tensions that were 
created were that sometimes we were saying to our media colleagues ‘can you 
do both these things?’, and sometimes they would understandably come back 
to us and say, ‘look, which is the more important?’. 
 
Even stronger tensions were observed when discrepancies exist between the strategies and 
values of the single organization and the overall strategy and campaigning approach of the 
network. The terms that best describe this internal conflict in the cases studied were those 
between so-called inside versus outside approaches (Schepers 2006) toward campaigning and 
policy change. Due to the nature of the networks, which are often used for campaigns with less 
focus on permanent policy work, established organizations often perceived difficulties in 
bringing in their competitive advantage, for example, of having the political capital that can be 
decisive for their mainly inside-oriented strategies. According to a member of an established 
group, “The big tension [in the network] has been between our model, and a model that’s been 
all ‘outsider’—the view is taken that change is only achieved from pressure from outside, and 
the insider track is dubious, or questionable”. 
 
Representing the opposite side of this strategic spectrum, others—often strongly campaign-
focused groups—add another important resource to the network: large supporter bases. These 
groups are public-oriented in a more straightforward way, especially in their interaction with 
the media. Network members, hence, are diverse and have unique resources that allow them to 
participate in a network and also define their potential role to play. Integrating those different 
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approaches, however, is extremely difficult and often members struggle to switch between the 
organizational and the network roles: 
 
They [members of the network] may not always work as in a network 
formation—they spend much more time and energy meeting with [civil 
servants] wearing their own organizational hat. …It can sometimes be 
limiting to operate as a network, because it may be better to use your own 
channels and reflect your own organization’s perspective or expertise than 
stick to a collective voice. 
 
We always retain a flexibility to not compromise the network members’ 
freedom to be who they are, and choose the times when we want to be a 
network as one. 
 
However, concerted efforts on behalf of the network are key to a network’s success in policy 
change processes, but this often requires a strategic balancing act: 
 
You need to channel your resources effectively and influence decision makers 
taking different angles: through direct lobbying and contacts that reach them 
personally, but you also need to build strong pressure from the grassroots and 
have a visible, more activist-oriented strand of your campaign. That’s 
extremely difficult to coordinate sometimes but I think only both—those two 
together—create the climate for change. 
 
In a similar vein, and from his experience in the environmental movement, Rosenblatt (2004) 
derives three different types of participant groups in the activist network: people-, resources- 
and solution-oriented groups, each with its own set of optimal resources, experiences, 
organizational structures and strategies. Although groups internally often focus on more than 
one orientation, Rosenblatt (2004) argues, in line with network research on social movements 
(Diani 2004), that networks are much more effective when, at the level of aggregated network 
units, expertise is further developed and specialized. 
Learning and identity in networks 
Scholars propose that networks offer more for the development of knowledge resources than 
just facilitating information exchange; participants in a network can learn together about 
pursuing collective efforts, hence creating new knowledge (Hibbert and Huxham 2007). 
 
However, this kind of value creation through learning in networks first of all requires a 
common objective or goal (Purdue 2007) in order to prevent participants from “selfishly 
acquir[ing] knowledge exclusively for the participant’s own organisation” (Hibbert and 
Huxham 2007:124), which would run the risk of the resources of some partners being exploited 
by dominant parties and free riders. Compared to networks in the business world where 
common goals are defined through profit orientation and network effectiveness is measurable 
in tangible ways such as patent registrations (Provan and Milward 2001), the definition of a 
mutual goal appears to be more difficult for civic networks. 
 
The study found that civic networks focused on identifying goals that were at the overlap of the 
objectives of participant organizations, and sought to cherry-pick specific objectives, such as 
providing inputs to a particular policy consultation. The networks’ activities were not explicitly 
concerned with developing a common understanding of deeper economic policy issues or 
unifying a grassroots movement (Diani 2003). For instance, prior work by UNRISD found that 
NGO professionals working on corporate responsibility and accountability issues have broadly 
four types of views on corporate power (Bendell 2004). For some, corporate power presents an 
opportunity, if it could be directed to better use. For others, corporate power presents an 
obstacle, a problem in a specific case because it is being used in ways that hinder their particular 
social or environmental objective. With both of these perspectives, people are not inclined to 
speak or think of corporate power as one phenomenon, rather as being different, depending on 
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the corporation in question. Others develop a wider and more categorical critique of corporate 
power, considering that it is an obstruction, a general systemic problem arising because of the 
logic of capital accumulation driven by stock markets, which leads to externalizing costs, and 
shaping discourse in ways that would always hinder social and environmental objectives. A 
fourth attitude to corporate power regards it as obscene. Such people consider it morally wrong 
for corporations to wield power, no matter how it was used, because they consider human self-
determination, freedom and democracy to be fundamental; therefore, the most powerful 
institutions in society must be democratic, or effectively controlled via democratic means, as a 
matter of principle (Bendell 2004:19). Not exploring the different perspectives on the systemic 
challenges of corporations, international trade and global capitalism means that formal 
opportunities for learning about causes, solutions and strategies is limited within the networks. 
However, it also means that coalitions can be maintained at a more superficial level of 
agreement, and thus specific objectives can be pursued in the short term, and the deeper issues 
addressed more informally by network participants. 
 
Hence, rather than addressing challenges to processes of shared goal development based on 
different ideological grounds, participants put forward difficulties in aligning more concrete 
operationally different approaches. As one respondent describes it: 
 
We had monthly board meetings…and they were pretty functional, pretty 
good, effectively-run meetings. [The board members] did things in a good, 
business-like kind of way. Beneath that there was, however, a planning 
group, which was a more operational management group, as opposed to the 
Board, being the strategic leadership group. My colleagues who worked in 
that group said that there were more difficulties. But that wasn’t so much a 
problem of different ideologies, but the problem of the different organizations 
taking different operational approaches that had to be worked out in that 
group. And I think the planning group bore more of the brunt of those 
differences because they were also meeting more often and were more 
immersed in the details of the campaign. 
 
Related to these concrete challenges that had to be mastered together, working in networks was 
generally seen as encouraging and motivating, especially for experts who normally work in 
relative isolation on issues of economic justice within their own organization. “When you work 
on specific policies, you are struggling with this often alone. If there are others—counterpoints 
or colleagues in other organizations that you can come together and meet with regularly, it does 
form a sort of basis for encouragement, shared enthusiasm for what you are doing, as well as a 
reaffirmation of purpose, in a sense.” 
 
Learning is often mentioned as contributing to the development of a shared identity and equal 
opportunities in networks (Bonner et al. 2005). However, networks can also waste this potential 
when members “exclude or side-line the consideration of learning: either implicitly, because the 
collaborative agenda is focused elsewhere; or explicitly, because it is regarded as unimportant” 
(Hibbert and Huxham 2007:124). 
 
The potential for learning was less than sufficiently utilized by the networks studied. From the 
perspective of the level of formalization, learning was seen as a side issue and resulting from a 
general interaction but was in no case found to be proactively initiated, fostered or formalized 
through feedback or evaluation processes. As one respondent says: “I wouldn’t say there are 
many opportunities for learning in the sense of formalized training or regular exchange and all 
that, because that’s not how it works here. Our aim is to increase our impact and make all our 
work more effective. If we can learn from others in this then this is what happens anyway.” 
This statement supports Beamish and Bedrow’s (2003) argument that lacking proactive efforts 
toward the initiation of learning processes does not per se exclude learning from occurring in 
networks. In a similar vein, this learning by doing mode was described as forcing members to 
“think outside of their institutional box”, representing a challenge especially to the majority of 
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the established inside groups (Schepers 2006), getting them “out of their comfort zone in the 
NGO community”, as one respondent explained. Interviewees reported on cases where 
established inside-oriented groups joined campaigns that put forward messages to the public 
and the media that were not in line with “the traditional message they [the established groups] 
would give to policy makers and corporations”. Grassroots-oriented groups in turn are urged 
by established groups to adopt their approaches to the joint message the network wants to 
communicate in the policy process (Rosenblatt 2004). On the one hand, such interaction can be 
viewed as leading to compromise or creating intellectual and strategic incoherence (Bennett 
2003). On the other hand, this interaction can enable realization of cultural commonalities and 
develop a shared identity within the networks. As one network participant said, “[Working 
through the network] provides numerous learning opportunities, especially when you work 
with traditionally rather disparate actors. Then you have people with different experiences and 
bringing different perspectives, and that makes for lots of learning and a better outcome, 
generally.” 
 
Learning then results from the tensions that arise by combining the needs of different groups. 
The literature on networks proposes that learning in networks happens horizontally, 
developing cohesion out of fragmented and divided groups; and vertically, connecting less 
powerful (often local) groups to powerful groups, authorities, agencies and other groups 
relevant in the policy area (Purdue 2007). 
 
Besides the learning opportunities between inside and outside groups, the contestation between 
Northern and Southern groups is frequently mentioned in the literature as leading to special 
tensions but also as offering new identity-building potential in networks (Crossey 2003). While 
networks were mainly busy with targeting national policies, we expected that the transnational 
impact of those policies (“actions in particular countries with a global significance” as described 
by Marchetti and Pianta forthcoming:11.) would lead to a stronger direct involvement of 
Southern groups through networks. 
 
However, this was, with the exception of one network, not the case. Although almost all 
networks show links to Southern groups, and some report the issues they work on in the North 
as interesting for Southern groups as well, Northern-Southern correspondence remains mainly, 
as the respondents put it, on the level of Northern NGOs “bringing [Southern] case-studies 
forward” in order to get “convincing material to back up” their claims and to “maintain that 
legitimacy of representing a local view”. Except for this role of Southern NGOs as sources of 
“credibility and advocacy” for Northern NGOs, only PWYP emphasized mutual exchange as 
essential to the network and highlighted the need for future more active membership of 
Southern NGOs, advancing learning processes between Northern and Southern groups and 
herewith ownership and control of network’ outcomes also for Southern groups. 
 
Learning requires managing psychological dynamics, trust, defensiveness and conflict (Purdue 
2007), and an openness and flexibility to reframe issues (Gray 2003). Reflection through network 
processes can offer a way to tackle differences step by step between members. A trusting 
network culture is thus required if network members do not want to settle for a half-hearted 
commitment to their cause. Learning in networks, related to identity building, thus consists not 
mainly of processes acquiring information and technical skills from other network members, 
but undergoing an internal change as well, creating new knowledge and developing greater 
reflexivity (Purdue 2007). Essential for this kind of knowledge sharing is an understanding of 
various dynamics specific to each network that does not derive from a one-fits-all approach but 
through processes of thorough evaluation. 
 
Evaluation mechanisms, however, barely existed among the four networks examined. In three 
of the four cases, our inquiry was said to be the first external evaluation of the network. Because 
learning emerges along the process rather than being systematically initiated and evaluated, 
this often leads to limitations to learning effects in networks. A lot of network members 
complained about a lack of reflection and analysis on how the network works, saying that 
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“there hasn’t been a great deal of creative learning” and “it [the network] is been very much 
operationally focused and not reflective into what has worked and what hasn’t”. 
 
A shared identity and self-understanding of a network as being part of something bigger, as 
frequently described in terms of a movement, builds an important part of activism in networks 
compared to single efforts. One factor facilitating strategic formation in a movement is its 
density or the linkages it shows between networks (Diani 2001). As mentioned before, although 
geographically quite close, only a few respondents actually perceived their organization as part 
of a movement that goes beyond their direct partners: “I really don’t think of [network] as a 
bigger movement or so. I think it is a quite narrow group of NGOs and getting involved in a 
network is a pragmatic matter to get more of our message out. That’s about it.” 
 
While some of the networks possess an internationally oriented action plan and are members of 
global policy issue–oriented networks, coordination mechanisms among national groups were 
merely described as advisory boards, comprised of national and regional representatives that 
keep an eye on national policy developments and the interventions of single groups and 
networks. Coordination efforts, in the sense of a transnational movement, thus remain on a 
more advisory level with informal exchange but no formalized coordinating structures or 
mutual strategic adjustments between networks. Strategic commonalities emerge rather than 
being proactively identified and addressed by national or issue networks. One respondent 
framed this process as follows: “For me, it was more that the things we have in common the 
issues we want to address, they developed. So our strategy was more evolving. More like a 
fluent process than a clear strategy from the beginning!” 
 
The recognition of being a part of a bigger picture of civic society in this respect is not a starting 
point for establishing civic networks in the cases examined but rather an outcome of network 
activity. Because they consisted mainly of established actors, one respondent summarized their 
specific challenge as “building the idea of a social movement” among organizations that are 
established in their field of expertise, and contrasted it with the initial challenges faced by 
grassroots mobilization that often build the focus of social movement research (Rosenblatt 
2004). 
 
These statements are in line with Bennett’s (2003:17) more sober observation that  
 
[w]hile networks can reduce the costs and conflicts often associated with 
bringing diverse players into issue and protest campaigns, they also may 
harbor intellectual contradictions that ultimately limit the growth of 
ideological or even intellectually focused movements. Rather than pushing 
toward ideological commonalities, activist networks then more often function 
as pragmatic information exchanges and mobilization systems.  
 
Further research is required on the management of learning in civic networks. Given 
discussions about the representativeness of civic networks (Marshall et al. 1999) and their 
accountability (Bendell 2006), this research should go beyond the emergence of activism and 
put a stronger focus on processes of reorganization and learning among established and less 
established Northern and Southern groups in civic networks. This could then inform how 
network governance and coordination could more effectively facilitate the accessing and 
strategic coordination of resources and generate learning among members from diverse 
organizational backgrounds. 
Civic network coordination and governance 
Questions about network governance and coordination are of crucial importance to enable 
processes of resource alignment, and learning and development in networks. Despite its 
importance, however, network governance and coordination is an area of research which lacks 
an adequate level of attention in the literature so far. Provan and Kenis (2007) in their recent 
review on this issue give several reasons for scholars’ disregard of efforts ‘‘illuminating the 
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structure of collective action’’ (Powell et al. 2005:1133). They argue that scholars have to learn to 
develop a network perspective themselves, as most studies still focus on rather the single 
organizational perspective on networks without taking overall network aspects into 
consideration, such as its governance and coordination. Another reason Powell et al. (2005) see 
is the reluctance of network and collaboration scholars to grasp issues of hierarchy and control 
which stand in stark contrast to the fundamental idea of networks as non-hierarchical 
collaborative arrangements.  
 
Despite this lack of attention paid by academics, network governance and coordination 
represent important challenges to practitioners and network managers. The most prominent 
proposition about coordination and governance in the literature is that networks are more 
decentralized, flexible and, as some argue, more democratic (Fuchs 2005) than traditional 
hierarchies. One can therefore argue, like Keck and Sikkink (1998), that in the face of the 
“NGOization” of activism in some countries in the past decades (Bendaña 2006), networks help 
to decentralize existing inter-organizational relations among groups. However, this study 
approached the issue of governance and coordination in an explorative manner and without 
any concrete idea of how the networks manage these issues. Hence, after describing how the 
networks found solutions to these issues, the paper will subsequently look at whether 
governance and coordination led to networks becoming a bridge between organizations. 
 
The diversity of organizations involved in civic networks represents, from a network 
governance and management perspective, a set of significant loosely arranged modules which 
can be rearranged to adjust to new challenges externally as well as internally (Rosenblatt 2004). 
This form of organizing comes close to what, in network research, is often labelled “bounded 
autonomy” (Kickert et al. 1997:266). Bounded autonomy in this sense refers to the capabilities of 
networks to mobilize participants in a way that, although the network benefits from the 
combination of different strengths, single identities are kept, and the identity of the network 
does not confound the goals and principles of individual participants (Diani 2001). Decisive in 
this respect is not only the strength of bounding ties, in the sense of developing solidarity 
among network members (Adler and Kwon 2002), but also the coordination and governance of 
networks as a whole (Provan and Kenis 2007) in order to get a grasp on all different sources of 
potential value to the collective action. Compared to market-based or hierarchical 
organizations, in which the range of possible steering structures are limited to existing 
frameworks of, for example, market competition, the exercise of developing such structures in 
civic networks seems to require open discussion among members about what kind of resource 
control and what level of formalization are acceptable to them. This exploring of possible 
governance forms and their negotiation require learning and trust among members (Diani 
2003). 
 
Rosenblatt (2004) describes this process for the environmental movement and emphasizes that, 
through organizing in networks, groups enter a next phase of strategic evolution and have to 
think of “the network” beyond organizational boundaries as a whole so it can be more powerful 
and more effective than single efforts. Issues of steering and control in networks are discussed 
among public management scholars rather than in the literature on activism and movements.17 
In this literature, an array of steering and control mechanisms is proposed, formal and informal 
in nature, that enable network governance, ranging from outcome control (for example, goal 
setting and evaluation, performance monitoring and rewarding), to behavioural control (such 
as planning, procedures, rules, norms and regulation), and social control and institutions (for 
example, boundary setting processes through member selection, and trust building or peer 
evaluation). 
 
Those mechanisms were only rarely found among the networks under study, which, in general, 
showed only low levels of formalization and coordination. For instance, reporting structures 
and evaluation, as discussed for network learning and identity, rarely happened through 
                                                          
17 For a detailed review of the network literature, see, for instance, Oerlemans et al. (2007). 
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organized initiatives. Similarly, membership was loosely managed, in most cases not even 
requiring a letter of engagement, and only 25 per cent of the respondents said their network 
required a membership fee. All networks, however, had a board, and often sub-themes and 
groups were coordinated by these boards but also showed a high level of independence, which 
means they were established for each campaign separately, and planned and implemented their 
actions independently. Although all networks showed basic structures of coordination, in terms 
of boards or steering committees and subunits, such as task forces that built the operational 
level of network operations, three issues were frequently mentioned in the interviews to build 
future challenges: formalization, durability and inter-connectedness.  
 
First, a common concern put forward by the participants referred to the stability of the 
networks’ own coordination and governance structures beyond punctual campaigning. These 
comprehensive and enduring structures were seen as essentially allowing members to work on 
cross-cutting issues—such as economic policies—increasingly extracting their “systemic 
nature”. This was often mentioned as a request to build up a durable knowledge and resource 
base which benefits all members’ engagement in these issues in the long run while keeping their 
organizational mandates as, for example, environmental or human rights NGOs. 
 
Contrary to these concerns, a different organizing and coordinating paradigm was identified 
through the survey data on the actual network level itself that basically opposes these intentions 
toward durable structures. A strong tendency toward punctual collaboration and campaigning 
was the major organizing principle among the networks under study. Mainly consisting of 
campaigning NGOs, network participants were described as strongly action and outward 
oriented, hence, hardly any attention, in terms of time and resources, was allocated to ongoing 
in-depth research and investigation. Although 88 per cent of the respondents said it was 
important for their organizations that the network lasts, this orientation led some respondents 
to put forward their concern about a lack of investment of resources into continuous 
“background policy work” that gives the network’s claims credibility: “I’m worried that they 
[future campaigns] won’t have the bite they had in the past because they won’t have that solid 
research background”. 
 
One reason was mentioned to be the general attitude of participants to first serve their own 
organizational needs. Engagement thus was described as more or less cyclically, depending on 
the organization’s priorities and the fit of the overall agenda of the network to these. Hence, 
coordination efforts and resources contributed to the network were limited and often remained 
at the stage of punctual commitment and the establishment of organizational structures only in 
terms of steering committees for single campaigns. 
 
Some future steps in the direction of more permanent structures for network coordination and 
governance, however, were proposed, often along with an expected growth of the respective 
network. An important issue for this process of organizational integration was the 
establishment of the network as a separate entity, mainly in terms of a formalization of 
membership of the board and decision-making structures but also through membership fees, 
administrative reporting functions and annual reports. Besides recognizing this necessity of 
building mechanisms that help steer the network, however, several respondents emphasized 
the importance of “keep[ing] the ground free of administrative pressures”, and continue to 
build “specific alliances around certain areas”. Further, the question of how far permanent 
structures in terms of steering committees also allow for continuous policy work was 
questioned by the respondents, as resource scarcity was mentioned as the major obstacle to the 
development of a working core in the networks. The need for this kind of work and organizing 
structure was mentioned, however, in order to build a strong core that develops substantial 
knowledge and resources upon which thematic groups and the steering committees can draw. 
 
Second, building stronger linkages among network members as well as between networks was 
mentioned as a future challenge to effective network management in order to further tackle 
systemic issues of economic policy and contestation. 
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At the time of the study, however, those linkages were rarely found among networks. One 
criterion that facilitates such linkages was identified through the parallel membership of 
leading organizations in two or more of the studied networks. Those linkages reveal the rather 
elite membership structure of these networks. So-called board interlocks among networks 
(Diani 2003) were most strongly found between two of the networks (CORE and PWYP) but 
were generally typical of the structure among these networks. Further, one network showed 
linkages to another European-wide coalition. Hence, linkages to other networks can be 
assumed. 
 
The lead members of CORE are also lead members of PWYP. Although TJM 
has been officially on the activism side of the Companies Act campaign work, 
a lot of this work was done by [two member organizations]. Were [those 
member organizations] doing it as members of [this network] or members of 
CORE? I’m not sure they know the answer to that or if it really matters. The 
point is that [network] has been, in the past, very much a policy development 
and coordination group, specializing on corporations. TJM instead has been 
much more the mass mobilization campaigning side. However I think that 
although the relationship may have started like separate strategies a couple of 
years ago, it’s not longer that clear-cut. There are certainly elements of 
activism and campaigning which CORE is very much involved in, and there 
are certainly elements of policy development which TJM is involved in. 
 
This statement of a participant representing one of the leading organizations further implies 
that networks allow organizations to address different issues by using different approaches of 
activism at the same time. However, it also shows that lead organizations potentially have a 
fairly dominant influence on the strategic development of these civic networks. The question 
then remains how far learning can bridge these leading organizations and their dominant 
influence on the networks’ coordination and how far other organizations, besides those leading 
ones, and in particular Southern groups,18 can be integrated into such governance structures. 
Further research is required into the implications of network governance and coordination for 
the relationships among groups and the hierarchy within the broader field of activist groups 
and movements. So far we can only say that governance processes in networks were found to 
consider equally all participants through consensus-based decision making; however, more 
systemic power hierarchies seem to leverage high levels of control and influence to a core group 
of organizations which appear to hold positions on the board of almost all networks.  
Outside networks 
Civic advocacy in networks involves learning political strategies and adopting strategic 
postures toward powerful governments and international organizations. NGOs that seek to 
influence public policy through networks employ a diverse repertoire of methods that conform 
to the dominant model of NGO advocacy strategies but also display significant differences, as 
illustrated in the following section, which focuses on issues outside networks. Following the 
structure of the previous inside perspective on networks, this section will first present an 
overview about the promises of networks for the role of NGOs in the policy process, analysing 
how far they resonate with the experiences of the four networks under study. 
 
This discussion proceeds in two steps. First, it will address external issues of how organizing in 
networks affects the political opportunities that members perceive and how this differs from 
their single organization’s perspectives. The second part focuses on impact-related promises. 
Both parts are primarily based on the presentation of the perceptions and experiences of 
network members. Additionally, however, both parts include a reality check, in the sense of 
external participants of the policy process elaborating upon their impression of the policy work 
of the networks. Therefore, both sections compare the perceptions of network participants to the 
information gained from civil servants and company representatives who build the external 
perspective on networks in the policy process. 
                                                          
18 This differentiation of Southern NGOs versus Northern NGOs is taken from the literature (Schepers 2006:285). 
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Table 2: Network promises (external) 
Promises Source 
Networks strengthen the institutional flexibility of groups by addressing 
different institutional actors and levels (for example “venue shopping”, or 
“boomerang pattern”) 
Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993; 
Keck and Sikkink 1998 
Networks show a more sophisticated awareness of the political opportunity 
structures within which they operate 
Tarrow 1994 
Networks allow to directly and strategically explore political opportunities and 
address policy issues 
Keck and Sikkink 1998 
Networks strengthen the visibility of activism and the impression of a collective 
approach of different groups in the policy process 
Diani 2003 
Networks strengthen the political legitimacy of groups Hudson 2001 
Networks bring new issues to the agenda of policy processes Keck and Sikkink 1998 
Networks transform the terms and nature of policy debates Keck and Sikkink 1998 
Networks increase the impact of activist groups on policy outcomes Keck and Sikkink 1998 
Network perspectives on political opportunities 
Traditionally, political opportunities for activism are determined by the structures of 
institutional politics. These structures, on the one hand, define the level of responsiveness to 
activists’ claims and on the other hand, the level of repression of activism in a political system. 
Drawing on the works of political process theorists (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989, 1994), 
scholars, mainly European, have compared numerous national political settings and their 
influence on activism.19 Since then scholars have been redefining the concept due to the 
transnational activities of networks and the increasingly dynamic relations to other actors than 
national governments (see, for instance, Marchetti and Pianta forthcoming). 
 
Although scholars found that national policy settings influence transnational activism in 
contemporary networks (Giugni et al. 2006), activism is no longer seen as simply a matter of 
repressed groups fighting the state (Goodwin et al. 2001). Instead, scholars situate activism in a 
dynamic relational field in which (Goodwin et al. 2001) interests of allies, opponents, together 
with the openness of the public to change, and the existence of supporting groups and elites 
(Joppke 1993), all influence the emergence, activity and outcomes of contentious politics 
(Goldstone 2004). 
 
Following the promise put forward in the literature, our question was how far has organizing in 
networks changed the perceptions of network members about their role in the policy process 
and how they, based on this changed perception, have explored their environment for 
opportunities in pursuit of their claims. 
 
The first set of promises identified in the literature addresses an increase in the awareness of 
political opportunities in networks, compared to a single organization’s efforts through a 
changed self-perception of members as part of a network. This network effect can be confirmed 
for the cases studied: for instance, 44 per cent of the respondents perceive the network to better 
demonstrate the “interconnectedness of social and environmental challenges”, and 51 per cent 
claim a larger supporter base: “It makes us more effective than we would be individually; it 
gives us the opportunity to have platforms to be heard, or to organize events jointly, shared 
lobbying platforms…it opens up a number of ways in which we can maximize our input on the 
issue, in ways that we might not be able to if we were just working on an issue on our own”. 
 
In a similar vein, 52 per cent of the network participants perceived the network as more 
legitimate and 76 per cent as more powerful, compared to the efforts of their individual 
organizations. As one participant remarked, “Yes I think you can extrapolate this to all issues. 
                                                          
19 See, for instance, Kitschelt 1985; Kriesi, 1998, Kriesi et al. 1995 
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None of these [policy processes] are easy to change—I mean to really show an impact—as an 
individual organization. But when you have a coalition then it does look much more solid, and 
people think ‘Wow, there are all these organizations working together with this message, there 
must be something serious going on’”. 
 
But how does this strong image substantially affect the opportunities explored by networks in 
comparison to traditional organizational strategies? One part of this expected change addresses 
shifting perceptions of what is possible, based on the means offered by the existing structure 
and brought to the network through the different institutional lenses of members. Although 
objective conditions of the political environment in which a network is embedded (Diani 2003) 
build the basis for the dynamics of contestation, these have to be interpreted by the network as 
opportunities or threats before they become reason enough for action. Therefore, activism is 
enabled not only by the effect these conditions have on power relations but also their effect on 
the networks’ interpretation of them (McAdam et al. 2005). Hence, in a network the same event 
or intervention can be interpreted by some as an opportunity and by others as a threat, and an 
exchange of views may change them. This exchange of perceptions and possible change of 
perceptions through networks can create new opportunities and open up potential for 
intervention beyond those of single efforts, or as one NGO respondent put it: 
 
When NGOs work on their own they work within a fixed political framework 
of what matters to them, what falls into their responsibility and first, what 
they think is possible to change. Take for instance [organization XY]—they 
have the lens of international human rights law. There is no responsibility in 
international human rights law on companies, no legal responsibility. That’s 
why they see all issues through the lens of the nation-state and that’s why 
exchange is so important. It’s all interwoven. 
 
Such perspectives then have to pay close attention to the cultural traditions, ideological 
principles, institutional memories and political taboos that create and limit the single 
organization’s perception of political opportunities (Diani 2003). However, the dominance and 
control of established groups over the probably less risk-aversive perceptions of political 
opportunities of other groups can lead networks to jeopardize this added network benefit. As 
one respondent stated: 
 
If you appear as a network you are expected to put forward a straight 
message. Without giving them all the list of side issues that popped up in our 
discussion but aren’t useful to get our message through. You have to 
compromise. So if your organization thinks that is important and a great 
opportunity to push it through but others are more hesitant then it can be a 
disadvantage in that way. 
 
However, looking at networks “from the other side of the desk”, as one civil servant put it, this 
network effect was less recognized. While three out of seven civil servants generally perceived 
networks as more powerful than single NGOs in the interviews, not one of them reported a 
changed perception of an NGO because it was part of a network. Often, civil servants did not 
even know the composition of the networks. Therefore, they did not differentiate between 
whether their departments were approached by an NGO or a network’s representative: 
 
We don’t find that NGO networks specifically target us. Sometimes it’s an 
individual NGO, sometimes it’s a network of NGOs. We gratefully receive the 
comments from anybody. So there isn’t anything specific about networks that 
makes them more or less attractive to us. 
They don’t communicate with us on behalf of the [network]; they 
communicate with us and sometimes we see that they’ve copied those 
communications to everybody else. So we don’t really differentiate between 
network and an individual NGO. 
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It’s difficult to say, because I don’t know—nobody has formally told me—
who actually is in the TJM. 
 
In the eyes of the civil servants, the major obstacles encountered by networks in the policy 
process were the networks’ lack of credibility, deep knowledge and reliable sources of 
information, and knowledge about the policy process, as well as their overly confrontational 
approach. Often more credibility was ascribed to a single organization; some civil servants 
remarked that the coordination of information and its reliability were the major problems of 
networks, and often single organizations were seen as much more reliable. Moreover, the 
dominance of only a few leading organizations in the network, and their linkages and personal 
relations to civil servants, continued to represent the strongest impression of civil servant–NGO 
contacts and exchanges. During the interviews, the same NGO representatives were mentioned 
by the civil servants several times, regardless of their affiliation to one of the networks. One 
business representative saw one of the leading organizations, rather than the network as a 
whole, as the “lobbying counterpart in the UK”. Similar to the board interlocks among the 
leading NGOs in the four networks, the interviews with external recipients revealed a more 
elite structure of NGOs in these civic networks. 
 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) further argue that multiple organizational angles enable networks to 
grasp opportunities on different levels and with different actors, targets and allies in the policy 
process. Networks, in this respect, are not simply exposed to a political environment of 
opportunities and constraints offered. Instead, activists themselves can create opportunities by 
expanding the political sphere that is applicable to them, by creating ties to other actors and 
structures, national political systems, the international political system, and international civic 
society and market systems (McAdam et al. 2005). 
 
Creating new ties, as mentioned in the literature, was found to be rather limited in the cases 
studied. Despite the small circle of well-known UK NGOs, only one network involved other 
sectors, such as government bodies and business representatives, but none in a governance 
capacity. Other networks were purely civic. For the future, their focus was in involving more 
NGOs in the network, such as those working on different issues (33 per cent), Southern NGOs 
(45 per cent), faith-based groups (41 per cent), and trade unions (45 per cent). A stronger 
involvement of business was less desirable (4.2 per cent) and governments not at all. Some 
benefit was seen in future involvement of multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations 
(8.2 per cent) and of media organizations (22 per cent). 
 
The reasons for this approach toward cross-sector involvement in the networks seems to be a 
critical view toward business influence on policy process. Eighty-six per cent of the respondents 
saw risks in the involvement of businesses in the work of the networks, and 98 per cent 
generally saw the involvement of businesses in policy processes as problematic. Although 48 
per cent of the respondents said businesses lobbied on fairly similar issues as those advocated 
by the network, only 8 per cent perceived business’ lobbying as sometimes in line with the 
network’s aims, and 44 per cent saw no similarities in their lobbying goals. With government 
representatives, compared to business, the boundaries were more blurred. Twenty-five per cent 
of the respondents knew at least one person in their network who previously worked for the 
UK government, and 48 per cent were in contact, through the network, with civil servants who 
had previously worked for a NGO. The cases do not give much of an indication of the networks 
exploring new political opportunities through the generation of new ties to non-traditional 
partners. The reasons for this are many, as further involvement of either business or 
government would pose challenges to the ability of the networks to campaign. However, the 
potential of networks to connect diverse groups with different power means that this could be 
reconsidered, and is discussed later under strategic challenges. 
Network perspectives on policy change processes 
Another claim put forward by the literature proposes that networks enable more coherent and 
direct policy contestation as compared to single efforts, allowing members to put much more 
NOBLE NETWORKS? ADVOCACY FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE “NETWORK EFFECT” 
JEM BENDELL AND ANNEKATHRIN ELLERSIEK 
23 
weight into their claims and strategies than through single efforts (Keck and Sikkink 1998). On 
the one hand, these promises point toward a more differentiated and strategic perception of the 
policy process through a network perspective. On the other hand, a more strategic and coherent 
application of strategies through networks compared to single uncoordinated efforts is 
proposed. 
 
McAdam and colleagues (2005), drawing on Ross (1977), argue that errors in the attribution of 
cause, and therefore fault, are more likely when groups work on their own rather than in larger 
groups. Single groups frequently see grievances, concerns or dissatisfaction with how a policy 
process develops or with its outcomes, as a function of their own deficiencies rather than a 
feature of the surrounding system. Only system attributions and thus critiques, they argue, 
afford the necessary rationale for a network’s activity (McAdam et al. 2005), or as one of the 
respondents put it: “collecting different opinions and experiences around an issue, we want to 
give the overall picture and clarify once and for all that company law and accountability is not a 
concern of a few niche NGOs but a widely shared system critique”. 
 
Through networks it is proposed that activists are able to proactively scan the political 
landscape in order to develop systemic rather than individual critiques and thus establish a 
background of rationality for their claims, for example, pointing toward differences in policy 
settings and transfer solutions from one policy setting to another through analogous 
interpretation and framing. This recognition of parallels was a change in perceptions that 
occurred in the case studies: 
 
it became clear that this was going to be a big issue, it wasn’t just isolated to 
the UK. It was an important one in many different countries. And there was a 
whole wave of corporate responsibility movements, NGO coalitions and 
campaigns on these developmental and CSR projects addressing all kind of 
institutional levels. So then it became clear that we here in the UK weren’t the 
only ones busy with this stuff. 
 
However, the question we had then was whether the shared critique and joint claims put 
forward by the network indeed appeared to be more systemic and fundamentally challenging 
than single efforts. Network participants believed this was the case, frequently reporting to 
better see “the big picture” and develop a more comprehensive understanding of how policy 
change works. 
 
The majority considered that policy processes are typified by decision makers mediating 
between competing interests in society and that pressures come from within different 
governmental departments as well as from external stakeholders. Also important in the NGOs’ 
assessment of how to interact with policy makers is their analysis of how other NGOs and 
groups influence those processes, as well as directly consulting civil servants. 
 
The objectives of the network campaigns were equally determined by external factors, such as 
the government’s policy focus and agenda, and ongoing efforts to change which offered a 
political window, as well as internal factors, such as the most commonly defined advocacy 
topics among members and a priori analyses of network founder organizations of the deepest 
challenges—its raison d’être. A more deliberate approach toward intervention in the policy 
process through networks was not obvious in the case studies. These, more proactive strategies 
were partly realized through public campaigns and external pressures, which once again 
highlights the importance of both internal and external strategies of civic networks (Dalton et al. 
2003). More frequently, however, we got the impression that the network enabled members to 
see more chances—political windows—but those were offered by the process and not 
proactively pushed for and opened up by the networks themselves. As one civil servant said: 
“What TJM was aiming at and what they have got so far from us—they have got some things—
are the bits which were always in relatively easy reach.” 
 
UNRISD PROGRAMME ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
PAPER NUMBER 31 
24 
So, are groups that organize in a network really more powerful in their interventions than 
single groups, or do all the negotiations in the network pre-emptively filter the more radical 
ideas in order to present the approach more coherently, thereby reducing the power of the 
advocates of more radical positions? The impression from the cases studied was mixed. A 
respondent describes it more negatively: 
 
Working through a coalition can make it easier for government to put you in a 
box. So effectively, they’ll get all the critics in one room at the same time and 
dress it up as a consultation, but actually what it means is that all of us lot 
have to engage with each other and not bring out our full agendas which are 
what I think much more straight forward points than what comes out of the 
negotiations in the group. Those are often so full of compromises that it 
becomes difficult to see your message in there. And for them it is quite 
convenient. I mean they can just bat off questions that come from one group 
in one session, without having to feel the pressure of having to meet with a lot 
of different stakeholders and have to respond to them and justify their 
approach again and again. 
 
Others see networks as an increased pressure on governance that also enable organizations that 
have fewer resources to engage in extensive long-term campaigning and policy process 
advocacy and lobbying. Many of the respondents were prepared to accept a loss of direct 
expression of their positions, in return for the network benefit of long-term lobbying, credibility 
and resource flows: 
 
Many organizations just do need enhanced credibility. There are a lot of fairly 
radical NGOs that might find it hard for their voices to be heard in 
government, but they have a lot to say that’s very legitimate. Becoming part 
of the broader, more mainstream, group together with less radical groups as 
well, church groups, and unions, gives them a voice and a backing that they 
wouldn’t have otherwise with government and others. I think for plenty, 
there is actually enormously enhanced credibility. Obviously there are costs 
that come with it, which are that you can’t just push your line. 
 
The literature suggests that cohesion among network participants leads to more effective 
interventions in the policy process and enhances the impact of NGO claims on decision making 
(Sikkink 1993). What emerged from the participant surveys was the impression of a network’s 
power and impact, compared to those of single organizations. However, the civil servants 
interviews said that networks were easier to handle, compared to single efforts by several 
individual organizations. A lack of cohesion was also perceived as weakening the penetrating 
power of network claims because campaigners could not seem to agree when, how and whom 
to approach among the respective governmental departments and civil servants. The common 
perception of networks by civil servants was far from the impression of “one voice, one claim”: 
 
By no means do we only ever get one request for one thing. So the network 
will exist, but it’s not formalized, and it’s not infallible. We do get duplication, 
among those people that [the civil servant] will meet. And we might get 
requests from some of them, for effectively the same thing. So we don’t see it 
as one voice—I think it is much more a loose, less formal network. 
 
In conclusion, the self-perception of member organizations changed because they were part of a 
network. They perceived themselves as more powerful and benefited from the different 
perspectives and resources brought together. Only to a limited extent was this confirmed by 
their environment. Civil servants perceived networks as easy to handle because they felt that by 
talking to network representatives they could achieve at one time what used to take them 
numerous consultations. 
 
Additionally, it is often argued that networks give leeway to members to follow up different 
strategies and allow for more radical approaches toward the policy process. However, civil 
servants do not really see the whole network but rather continue to talk to the same people 
NOBLE NETWORKS? ADVOCACY FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE “NETWORK EFFECT” 
JEM BENDELL AND ANNEKATHRIN ELLERSIEK 
25 
from the same leading organizations. The question therefore remains: how far are these 
organizations are really able and willing to push through the network approach, even though 
this is contrary to their own organizational goals and tactics?  
Network Impacts 
The research found that many of the promises of networks are reflected in the civic networks 
studied, although not systematically realized by the participants or network coordinators. The 
implication is that efforts to impact targeted policies might have been more successful if the 
networks were more strategically employed. This section reflects on the impacts that networks 
had in shaping public policy, which helps set the context for discussing strategy more fully in 
the subsequent section. It also discusses challenges to the effective management of networks, 
some of the drawbacks that emerged, and the extent to which networks enabled independently 
strategic rather than historically repetitive behaviours. The focus on policies is not to undermine 
the importance of the potential impacts of the networks on the participants themselves, which 
may be more important in the long term, but to give some insight into the immediate external 
impacts that have been realized already. Nevertheless, to augment the earlier discussions of the 
networks’ impact on the perceptions of and about the participants, this paper also provides 
some evidence of the level of mobilization attained by each network. 
 
It is difficult to attribute the cause of a particular event in complex societal systems like public 
policy processes. In natural science, a particular intervention can be shown to correlate and 
likely cause a particular effect. In social science, the extrapolation of cause from correlation is 
complicated by the infinite connections to other factors. An NGO may campaign for a policy 
change and a policy change may occur, but a third factor may have caused the latter, or have 
influenced both the development of the campaign objectives and the policy change. Thus a 
correlation of campaigns and policies does not necessarily imply an autonomous power within 
civic society. However, for the purposes of the discussion, we assume that a policy change in 
line with civic network goals was partly the result of that network’s activities, especially when 
this is supported by opinions from network participants and the civil servants involved.  
 
A particular change in policy may seem significant or insignificant depending on the view of 
the observer. Thus impacts can be assessed in terms of the networks’ own goals, the participant 
organizations’ goals, opinions from the intended beneficiaries themselves, other stakeholders 
and finally, an analyst’s perspective of the beneficiaries’ interest based on prior analysis can 
become necessary when the intended beneficiaries are diffuse, such as all poor people, or all 
people affected by environmental degradation, as in the case of the networks studied. This does 
not reduce the importance of bringing forth views from specific groups of affected persons 
when assessing the importance and appropriateness of any campaign or policy change, but that 
level of analysis is beyond the reach of this phase of research. The paper will return to these 
issues of accountability of networks and researchers alike.  
CORE 
In late 2000 a group of NGOs, called the Corporate Accountability Network (CAN-Network), 
agreed to form the CORE coalition as a way to feed into the Company Law Review and 
challenge its contents. In 2001 Peter Frankental, from Amnesty, Simon McCrae, from Friends of 
the Earth UK, and Niall Watson from WWF-UK, confirmed CORE’s establishment and 
provided funds to hire Brian Shaad as a part-time coordinator. Deborah Doane at New 
Economics Foundation chaired, with Christian Aid and Traidcraft soon joining the new 
coalition. CORE turned its attention to the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) proposal 
that company boards should consider “intangible assets of the company”, such as the value of 
the brand and reputation, as well as intellectual copyrights and patents (DTI 2002). This would 
be done through an Operating and Financial Review (OFR) (DTI 2003). Initially, the activists 
criticized the DTI recommendations that would leave it up to individual directors to decide 
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what is material to their companies, providing no real prospect of an actual, uniform standard 
for reporting, such as companies having to publish an environmental and/or social report to 
shareholders. However, the agenda began to shift, with not only NGOs but also financial 
institutions such as Cooperative Financial Services (CFS) supporting a more defined protocol 
for reporting. Subsequently the DTI announced a draft of the new law where the OFR “shall 
include information about the employees of the company and its subsidiary undertakings, 
environmental matters and social and community matters”; and “shall include analysis using 
financial and other key performance indicators, including information relating to 
environmental matters and employee matters”.20 The draft was widely seen as a successful 
outcome of a multistakeholder input into the policy process. However, just before its 
conclusion, Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, cancelled the OFR. 
Reports suggested that he had done this after direct lobbying by the Confederation of Business 
and Industry (CBI), which played to his interest as being seen as “pro-business” and reducing 
the administrative burdens on enterprise (Webb 2005). The decision came as a shock to those in 
the financial industry who had been participating in consultations developing the proposals, as 
well as to the NGOs. Together they strongly criticized the decision and announced that they 
would focus their efforts on the Company Law Review. 
 
This was the context for extensive mobilization by CORE on the Company Law Review, 
including a partnership with the TJM to mobilize massive letter-writing to Members of 
Parliament by their constituencies. Some MPs reported that they had never received so many 
letters about a single issue (TJM 2006). 
 
A Companies Bill was written and concluded its passage through Parliament to become law as 
the Companies Act 2006, receiving Royal Assent on 8 November 2006. The extensive lobbying 
of MPs on the issue may have contributed to some becoming expert on the issues at hand. Some 
MPs, from various political parties, even went further than the NGOs in the requirements on 
companies. This level of awareness meant that additional requirements were made on the bill as 
it passed through Parliament, namely, stronger social and environmental reporting 
requirements. The resulting Companies Act 2006 now requires that the 1,300 or so publicly 
listed companies in the UK report on the following issues where they are necessary to 
understanding the company’s business: 
 
 environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s business on the 
environment); 
 the company’s employees;  
 social and community issues; and 
 risks through company supply chains (CORE 2008). 
 
The Companies Act 2006 also increased directors’ duties to take account of stakeholders other 
than shareholders. However, it has been left to directors to determine what it means to take 
account of other stakeholders and also what social and environmental issues are material to the 
business and the nature and extent of reporting on these issues. The new law is allied to a 
concept of “enlightened shareholder value” whereby social and environmental performance are 
considered to have some material impact on corporate financial performance and therefore of 
interest to some shareholders.21 The new duties on directors and the new reporting 
requirements are thus not about the importance of stakeholders or social and environmental 
issues in their own right but in terms of how they impact on business performance. The quality 
of the decisions and the reporting will thus be limited to what is relevant to financial 
performance. Much will depend on the guidance the government provides on the meaning of 
this new law. Given the concerns, the government announced it would review in two years 
                                                          
20 www.dti.gov.uk/cld/financialreview.htm, accessed in July 2008. 
21 www.tjm.org.uk. 
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whether compulsory reporting standards are needed, and to ask NGOs what they think.22 
Another important mechanism for defining what this law means in practice will be any 
subsequent jurisprudence based on court decisions when a company or a director is challenged 
for breaking this new law.  
 
The change in UK corporate law brought it up to date with what had already been agreed in 
other European countries like Denmark, France and the Netherlands. The “success” of the 
campaigning by CORE needs to be tempered by the knowledge that far lower levels of public 
mobilization and campaigning were required to achieve mandatory social and environmental 
reporting in other European countries. Given the Anglo-Saxon approach to shareholder 
freedoms, and a strongly neoliberal government that was basing UK economic strategy on a 
financial services sector thriving through greater financial freedoms and innovations, CORE 
had a tougher task than its European counterparts. The resulting legislation was, however, 
reflective of the neoliberal ideology in the United Kingdom. 
 
The law reflects a growing consensus in British business community that corporate 
responsibility is a financially sound approach to business. This consensus developed in the late 
1990s as the concept of companies voluntarily accepting more responsibilities for social and 
environmental issues spread. However, research does not support this claim as a general 
principle. Instead, it finds that there are cases where some social and environmental malpractice 
is financial damaging and where it is not, and where social and environmental excellence is 
financially and rewarding and where it is not (Maron 2006). The industry sector, the profile of 
the corporate brand, ownership structure of the company, and nature of a societal issue are all 
key to whether that issue is material to financial performance or considered to be so by 
shareholders. The rise of private equity and hedge funds during the start of the twenty-first 
century is a reminder of the incoherence in basing a public policy for corporations on 
enlightened shareholder value when there are only so many “enlightened” shareholders with 
an interest in social and environmental dimensions of business performance. The only means of 
ensuring the coherence of a law would be if it were coupled with a law that regulated 
shareholder behaviour. This is unlikely as the Companies Act was based on a desire to maintain 
the primacy of unfettered private property rights in corporations, that is, shareholder autonomy 
and control, while encouraging more strategic attention to social and environmental issues by 
corporate executives. A law that encouraged enlightened shareholder value, such as by 
rewarding investors with long positions in companies, holding stock over many years, would 
challenge that approach. 
 
This neoliberal approach to corporate law was not something we found shared by the NGOs in 
CORE. They sought greater corporate accountability to society, rather than to more enlightened 
shareholders, or as one civil servant put it, “[W]e had ‘enlightened shareholder value’”— CORE 
and others didn’t like the ‘shareholder value’, business didn’t like the ‘enlightened’ part of it.” 
 
However, in general CORE sought whatever mechanisms would deliver more commitment 
from companies, including using financial arguments. Therefore we found little evidence in the 
case of CORE that a third factor was involved in influencing both CORE’s campaign and the 
associated public policy change. Perhaps its interest in the pragmatic use of any arguments that 
would advance corporate accountability could be interpreted as an aversion to political 
economic approaches involving a principled stand on the importance of stakeholders rather 
than shareholders. Perhaps NGOs’ interests in being able to report some successes to their 
managers, advisory boards, trustees and members meant that the participant NGOs focused 
more on the practical “win” of achieving some form of mandatory reporting, rather than the 
political “loss” of a further restatement of the primacy of shareholder freedoms that the new 
Companies Act represented. To condemn a law that appeared to many as a step forward, on the 
grounds of political principle, would not sell well to an NGO’s various constituencies as well as 
                                                          
22 www.foe.co.uk. 
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the fragile epistemic community of investors, civil servants and other stakeholders, who had 
worked toward the new law. Instead, CORE organized a party to celebrate the new law. 
 
However, the emphasis on a neoliberal approach to shareholder primacy is not a peculiarly 
British phenomenon. The European Commission had been pushing for the removal of many 
regulations restricting shareholder freedoms, such as Sweden’s preferential voting rights for 
shareholders with long-term holdings (Burkart and Lee 2008). The growing integration of the 
EU has progressed despite the road bump of referendums rejecting the draft EU constitution 
and Lisbon Treaty. Many felt that these treaties were rejected because they confirmed the 
shareholder dominance over corporations (George 2008). This integration meant that the EU 
became more important to the objectives of CORE. The fundamental lack of direct 
representative power at the heart of the EU structure, with the European Commission being the 
main legislative body that works closely with national civil services, particularly trade and 
industry ministries, and the European Parliament being largely a ceremonial talk shop, 
manifests itself in the case of corporate accountability. With growing consensus among civic 
society across Europe of the need for new rules on corporations, in June 2002 the European 
Parliament passed a resolution stating that companies should be required to supply information 
on the social and environmental impact of their operations (Bendell 2002). However, the 
European Commission continued its neoliberal agenda, such as increasing pressure on Sweden 
to reform its stock market rules, and encouraging changes in corporate law in the new accession 
countries. Five years later the European Parliament passed a similar resolution based on the 
Report on Corporate Social Responsibility: A New Partnership, which “urged” the European 
Commission to create legal obligations regarding directors’ duties, mechanisms of redress for 
foreign affected persons, and environmental and social reporting, to reinforce to corporate 
accountability. Achieving that resolution required a major input of time and resources from 
civic society groups across Europe, and was claimed as a success by groups like CORE. 
However, a more significant development in corporate accountability that year was the decision 
of the European Commission not to require a public registration of the activities of lobbyists, 
including their financial arrangements and clients (Reuters 2007). Given that corporate lobbying 
of Eurocrats is a key mechanism in the policy process affecting corporate governance across the 
EU, this was a major failure, and indicated a weakness in the ability of national NGOs to 
quickly mobilize on EU matters that affect the frameworks within which they seek to achieve 
their public missions. Part of the reason for this may be that UK NGOs seek to be perceived as 
apolitical, in order to not alienate potential donors and to avoid audits and challenges from the 
UK Charities Commission which requires NGOs to be apolitical to the extent that they focus on 
their mandates and base any advocacy on evidence from their on-the-ground experience.  
 
During a one-day workshop in 2006, participants in the network agreed that CORE had 
achieved some progress since its inception, including:  
 
 Building a wide base of support for Corporate Accountability regulation. 
 High level of awareness of CORE in Parliament and Government—it is recognized 
as a serious player. 
 Media awareness of Company Law (and CORE). 
 Raised the stakes for government on Company Law—Community and 
Environment are now explicit statements in the Bill which would have been lost 
without CORE. 
 Had a significant ‘multiplier’ effect—more cooperation between NGOs on these 
matters, achieving other outcomes, such as increased transparency on corporate 
lobbying and increased finance sector engagement. Multiplier effect applied to 
Europe—many coalitions got off the ground with CORE support. 
  Growing international reputation as a leading focused coalition within civil 
society (CORE 2006:1). 
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This list illustrates CORE’s interest in generating a movement for greater corporate 
accountability within the United Kingdom and across Europe. However, the strategy of the 
network was not developed toward the creation of a social movement, as discussed in earlier 
sections. Some of the shortcomings of the network in its ability to build a movement were 
becoming apparent in 2006. Some participants in CORE were concerned they had not built on 
their wider membership. In addition, the financial sustainability of CORE was in doubt, and in 
2006 CORE could no longer afford to pay its chairperson. 
 
The lack of finances illustrates the dependence of CORE on the ability and interest of 
participants on the Steering Group (SG) to access internal funds and spend them on CORE. The 
continued success of CORE was therefore dependent on the personal commitment of existing 
SG members. Subsequently, after the new Companies Act, two key organizations downscaled 
their involvement in CORE. In 2007, FoE, which had been key to convening the network, 
decided to place less emphasis on corporate accountability campaigns and focus more on clear 
environmental issues such as climate change. This was explained by one former FoE staff 
member as a feeling that “there is only so far you can go with corporate law, either in attaining 
policy changes or in bringing your members along with you”. The upsurge in interest in 
environmental issues due to rising concern with climate change in the United Kingdom since 
2006 meant that FoE wanted to both offer itself as the environmental organization to support as 
well as influence the climate change agenda more directly. Compared to reducing one’s carbon 
footprint, corporate law campaigns were not that easy to sell to supporters, or to get them 
involved. Christian Aid also decided to scale back its involvement as it underwent a 
reorientation of its policy advocacy. Emerging themes included finance and climate change, 
both of which could relate quite clearly to CORE, because of the need to move the duties and 
reporting agenda into the financial services sector as discussed above, and the role that 
mandatory reporting of carbon emissions might have in encouraging their reduction. However, 
old-fashioned approaches to realignments of organizational strategies involve restructuring of 
departments and budgets, and so existing activities can be suspended even though they might 
relate to the new strategy. These developments indicated that CORE participants had not been 
able to embed the dual importance of corporate accountability work and continuity of 
participation in networks into their own organizations’ strategies that would then necessitate 
continued budgetary and staff commitments. How a network might help its participant 
organizations to achieve such a strategic long-term commitment and thus stabilize the 
network’s future is discussed below.  
 
This insecurity of funding and participant commitment means that the lasting impact of CORE 
on British civic society is debatable. Evidence for the impact on European and international 
civic society is rather weak. CORE participants are involved in efforts at creating Europe-wide 
and international collaborations on corporate accountability. However, these meetings have 
been poorly attended, and struggled to find a common agenda amid concerns about limited 
resources and the need for funding.  
Sakhalin Island Network 
The case of the loose civic network campaigning on Sakhalin Island demonstrates the value of 
international networking to the participants. As described earlier, the consortium of oil 
companies building a pipeline across this Russian island was the focus of an international 
campaign of environmental NGOs. Through their informal sharing of information they 
impacted on the project’s design, associated mitigation activities, community benefits and 
financing, and prompted a change in the project’s ownership. They inspired the creation of new 
international scientific advisory mechanisms, brought the force of UK law on freedom of 
information and professionalism to bear on the UK government departments, informed Russian 
government interventions on environmental grounds, and exposed a disconnect between a 
major corporation’s rhetoric on responsible enterprise and their normal business activities. It is 
arguable that they cost Shell billions of pounds in lost future revenues. However, it is unclear 
how these impacts will affect the social and environmental performance of the Sakhalin 
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hydrocarbon industry in the years to come, with the success of the campaign potentially 
undermining the continued relevance of some of the key network players in influencing that 
industry. Unless the UK government, oil companies, public and private financial institutions, 
and the local and international NGOs recognize the conundrum and work toward a systemic 
solution to the global governance of hydrocarbon extraction and transportation, what may 
initially seem as a great success of nimble civic networking may come to be seen as a hallmark 
failure.  
 
Back in 2003, 50 Russian NGOs issued a statement expressing concern about the Sakhalin Island 
pipelines. As the project progressed, one local group, Sakhalin Environment Watch (SEW), 
continued to put out information on social and environmental problems occurring through the 
construction of the pipelines. However, the influence of this campaigning was minimal, and the 
project continued with few modifications. It was when greater connection was made with 
NGOs based in one of the home countries of the leading oil company involved in the Sakhalin II 
project, Royal Dutch Shell, that their influence grew. British NGOs FoE and WWF campaigned 
hard on the two connections that the United Kingdom had to this project on the other side of 
the world: the company Shell and the public institutions that were about to finance their project.  
 
Overall the network was seen by its participants as successful, for example, in reaching its goal 
to change the conduct of the Sakhalin project: “I think we’ve been pretty successful on a variety 
of things. There have been changes to the project which have taken place, the shifting of the 
offshore pipeline route probably being the biggest one.” 
 
A key success that participants claim is in making the Sakhalin pipeline a major international 
sustainable development issue. The participant explained that the loose network of NGOs “has 
taken the largest integrated oil and gas project in the world and elevated some of the major 
environmental impacts and problems behind that project to the highest levels of government 
and public attention”. 
 
The international pressure worked hand in hand with greater mobilization by local NGOs, for 
instance, with SEW presenting a petition against financing of the project signed by over 10,000 
Sakhalin residents to the Annual General Meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) in May 2006. 
 
Besides changing the conduct of the project, however, some participants believed the new 
connections between various actors are themselves a sign of success: “It’s been highly successful 
as a model of how a diverse group of NGOs with a lot of different missions—animal protection 
groups, bank reform groups, environmental groups, science-driven conservation groups—come 
together...effectively around a common agenda”.  
 
The loose network’s growing activities had an impact on how some were perceived by other 
groups, such as the media and civil servants. One of the NGO participants explains that once 
the story was live, journalists considered NGOs as valuable sources, not only of information but 
also for interpreting that information: “[t]here’s been a small circle of journalists working for 
quite influential media sources who have often come to us for insights, for advice”.  
 
The role of the network in building the expertise of its participants meant that some in 
government began to see them as a useful resource. One NGO participant explained that the 
EBRD even “considered hiring us as experts to help us address the issues. For a number of 
reasons that didn’t work out, but it certainly presented a lot of interesting professional issues 
for the organization”. 
 
Interviews with the UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) also indicated that 
NGOs provided useful information about what was happening on the ground. However, ECGD 
and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) officials expressed a negative 
view of the NGOs’ analysis of that information and their recommendations. Their main 
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arguments were that NGOs concerned themselves with single issues such as “save the whales”, 
whereas ECGD had to consider a broader set of issues; that many NGOs were unrealistic in 
wanting the project cancelled, whereas ECGD had a mandate to enable trade and promote 
social and environmental performance associated with that; that some NGOs were hypocritical 
in their demands, given the British economy’s dependence on hydrocarbons; and that some 
NGOs just wanted ECGD shut down. We might speculate whether a more formalized network 
of NGOs could have better challenged these opinions by illustrating a common agenda 
incorporating diverse interests, articulating from the outset a strategy for continued influence 
over the project after the suspension of EBRD and ECGD, as well as a vision for the future of 
these organizations, and a clear statement on the NGOs’ attempts to reduce their carbon 
footprints as part of their own responsibility in relation to the Sakhalin project.  
 
However, unlike the other cases discussed in this paper, many of the NGOs were not interested 
in improving their standing with the civil servants they engaged with. The British NGOs 
believed that the EBRD and ECGD needed to be challenged to transform their normal 
operations, not only on Sakhalin but on their other core business, such as underwriting the sale 
of airplanes and armaments. The interviews with ECGD revealed a work culture that is 
generally supportive of business opinions, due to a traditional reliance on corporate 
information on projects. This is because the applicant company has the most information on its 
proposed project and the normal ECGD assessments are focused on the finances, which the 
applicant companies clearly have a major self-interest in getting right. One NGO explained, 
“they have an almost overly sympathetic view to what business says...so they’re almost 
surprised when we say: ‘just because Shell says that doesn’t mean it’s true’”. Therefore the 
NGOs resorted to public condemnation and legal action to influence the EBRD and ECGD, 
which led civil servants to see NGOs in a confrontational role. The nature of this legal action is 
discussed below.  
 
The impacts that the network has had on the application of public policy and the practice of 
private enterprise became clearer during 2007 and 2008, as a number of initiatives were 
launched and announcements made by the company and the Russian government. The timing 
of these initiatives and announcements as well as the opinions of NGO participants, civil 
servants and confidential company informants, help piece together a picture of the influence of 
the NGO network on these developments.  
 
One of the key impacts was increasing the public accountability of the EBRD and ECGD. “No 
one in the general public knows who they are, or what they do,” explained one NGO 
participant, adding that their campaign was “bringing needed light on their damaging 
activities”. Two key mechanisms that NGOs have used for this are the Freedom of Information 
Act and the process of Judicial Review of government decisions.  
 
In February 2007, the social justice NGO, The Corner House, put in a Freedom of Information 
(FoI) request to the ECGD, asking the department to indicate whether it had given any 
“confirmation of conditional ECGD support” for Shell’s Sakhalin II oil and gas project. Mike 
O’Brien, then minister of the Department of Trade and Industry, had made a public 
announcement saying the decision to back the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company (SEIC) 
project had not yet been taken (Corner House 2007). However, in June 2007, the ECGD released 
a letter it had written to SEIC over three years earlier, confirming that it had approved 
conditional support for $1 billion’s worth of contracts for the Sakhalin II project. The Corner 
House reported that the ECGD had also confirmed in a letter to FoE that its March 2004 letter 
was legally binding on the department. This sharing of information between the NGOs enabled 
them to assess, in their opinion, that the March 2004 decision conflicted with ECGD’s stated 
policies. In August 2007, WWF joined The Corner House in requesting a judicial review—a 
court proceeding in which a judge reviews the lawfulness of a decision or action made by a 
public body. Crooks and Peel (2007), writing for the Financial Times, reported that “[j]udicial 
reviews have become an increasingly popular tool for campaigners to challenge official 
decisions, winning high-profile successes such as the High Court ruling...that the consultation 
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process during a government review of policy on nuclear energy last year had been ‘very 
seriously flawed’ and ‘procedurally unfair’”. 
 
Dan Tench, a partner at Olswang, the law firm, said the WWF claim reflected the increasingly 
“hot issue” of “extra-territorial” judicial reviews, in which the impact of the policy being 
challenged was mostly overseas (Crooks and Peel 2007). At the time of writing, the judicial 
review was not concluded, but the media coverage had already highlighted how the ECGD and 
UK ministers were stressing their lack of decision in public, while ECGD were providing some 
reassurances in private: the letter to SEIC required the company to keep the agreement with 
them “confidential”.  
 
Given the information revealed from their first requests, FoE requested that ECGD release the 
information it had received from government departments about the project. The ECGD 
refused, and it went to the FoI tribunal, which agreed these letters were of public interest and 
ordered their release. The ECGD appealed that decision, which was pending at the time of 
writing (SEW 2007). 
 
The judicial review increased the contentiousness of this case, and so in March 2008 the SEIC 
announced it was no longer seeking public financing from ECGD or its US equivalent 
(Environmental Finance 2008). Prior to that, in January 2007 the EBRD withdrew from 
negotiations for a $300 million loan for Sakhalin II development (EBRD 2007). The bank often 
takes about a year to sign off a project, but took four years over this, before saying no. One 
NGO participant remarked that “[W]e don’t have the EBRD—a public institution—giving 
millions of public money to Shell for a very shoddy job. Which is therefore a success, no matter 
how it’s come about.”  
 
The impact of this absence of public financing on the social and environmental performance of 
the project is unclear, as discussed below, but the impact for Shell is clear. 
 
The fact that the EBRD was not involved, and the ECGD was only involved on a confidential 
and conditional basis, meant that Shell did not have the level of engagement of the UK 
government (through the ECGD) and other Western governments (via EBRD) that would have 
maintained communication with the Kremlin about the project. During April 2006 the Russian 
government and judiciary began to intervene, citing environmental concerns that had been 
raised by the NGOs. A Sakhalin appellate court upheld a ruling to halt the construction of a 
jetty in Aniva Bay, pending completion of environmental reviews. “The Russian government 
has, in a very Machiavellian way, used all the evidence that we have produced—or at least that 
SEW had produced and had been talking about for three or four years,” explained one NGO 
participant. By August, the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources announced it would sue the 
project sponsors due to design flaws posing safety risks and environmental damage. This 
escalated to a suspension of the project and negotiations between the SEIC and Kremlin. In 
December 2006, an agreement was reached through which Shell lost half of its 55 per cent share 
of the $20 billion project, with the government-owned oil company Gazprom taking a majority 
stake.  
 
In the Western media these actions were portrayed as part of a move against private ownership 
of Russia’s oil and gas industry that had started with the destruction of Yukos and continued 
with the state regaining control of Gazprom, which then acquired Sibneft. The state-owned 
share of the total oil production increased from 16 per cent in 2000 to almost 40 per cent in 2007. 
This suggested the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources’ concerns about ecological impacts of 
the project did not reflect a new environmental concern, but were a tactical use of legitimate 
environmental concerns to achieve the state’s political and economic goals—resource 
nationalism (Bradshaw 2007). 
 
With the reduced role of Shell and no financing from Western public financial institutions, in 
2008 the Western NGOs downscaled their work on Sakhalin, shifting their focus to regions such 
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as the Arctic, and Alaska. One NGO participant said in 2008 that “Sakhalin II is 90 per cent 
complete so there is little to influence in terms of the design and construction phase of the 
project. Sakhalin Environment Watch continues to monitor the final implementation on the 
ground”. In January 2008, the governor of Sakhalin spoke out publicly in solidarity with 
protestors of the Sakhalin II project. Meanwhile in January 2008, WWF Russia launched a 
campaign aimed at Gazprom about another pipeline, across the Ukok Plateau in Siberia (WWF 
Russia 2008).  
 
The network impacted at the level of international institutions, through the creation of a 
Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel in 2006. An independent expert body, established under 
the auspices of the World Conservation Union, was established to provide long-term advice on 
the project’s impact on the whale population. Given the scientific doubts and arguments about 
the importance of the project to the whale population, one civil servant remarked that “[O]ne of 
the good things the Sakhalin project has done is to put together the Western grey whale 
advisory panel. And they are the world’s best. And they are advising in a public way. It’s a 
great achievement that we [at this government department] will claim a small amount of 
influence in.” 
 
Although the participants’ own assessment of their network is positive, their impact on the 
social and environmental performance of the project itself is less clear. “There have been 
changes to the project which have taken place, the shifting of the offshore pipeline route 
probably being the biggest one,” said one NGO participant. In April 2006, Shell acknowledged 
the project’s impact of indigenous people and agreed to develop a Sakhalin Indigenous 
Minorities Development Plan, initially committing $1.5 million. The company also launched the 
Sakhalin Salmon Initiative, a public-private partnership to support conservation and 
sustainable use of wild salmon and their ecosystems, and to build institutional capacity for 
conservation. One NGO involved in campaigning with other NGOs on the pipeline, the Wild 
Salmon Center (2008), is a key partner in the initiative. It was one example of a constructive 
engagement between the company and NGOs. There was a two-year stakeholder engagement 
process culminating in a conference of 200 stakeholders. One NGO participant said that  
 
we had oil companies, indigenous people, commercial fishermen, government 
agencies, scientists; we had foreign experts. Everyone who has something to 
do and some interest in salmon conservation and sustainable use on the island 
was at this conference. Since then, we’ve created an organization on the 
island, and are working really closely with the regional government and all 
those stakeholders to implement a series of positive conservation and 
sustainable management projects on the island.  
He explained that being involved with the campaigning NGOs “really helped raise our profile 
on the island, and gave us the room to build an incredibly successful Sakhalin salmon 
initiative”.  
 
The salmon issue was one that the EBRD had focused on in its assessments of the project, 
requesting Shell to conduct important new erosion control efforts after a fact-finding mission 
found serious erosion around wild salmon-spawning rivers. This illustrates one concern some 
have expressed about the lack of Western public financial institutions in the project. One civil 
servant said before the financing was called off, that “if the [NGO] objective was to try and 
ensure that the project was implemented, but implemented to high standards, then the way 
they are engaging us at the moment seems to be attempting to stop us from supporting it, rather 
than to encourage us to support it provided the standards are met”. Michael Bradshaw (2007:1) 
of Leicester University argued that that “with the departure of the EBRD, the NGOs have lost 
an opportunity to leverage compliance on environmental and social issues”. We return to this 
issue when discussing network strategies.  
 
A broader goal and impact for some of the British NGOs was “to test the CSR rhetoric on a 
major project”. For these NGOs there is a battle of ideas occurring between those who want 
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greater mandatory corporate accountability, such as the members of CORE and TJM, and the 
proponents of voluntary corporate responses to social and environmental challenges and thus 
less governmental or intergovernmental intervention. The problems with this project mean at 
the very least that “non-technical risks”, as Shell calls social and environmental performance 
issues, should be taken into account earlier in the company’s project design process. NGOs 
hope that regulators will see the implications being that oil companies still do not operate well 
in sensitive environments, and will restrict the nature and location of their activities. “Sakhalin 
is supposed to be the best the industry can offer, but it is not good enough to be operating in 
sensitive areas,” said one NGO participant, “this is the message we are taking to the Arctic.” 
 
The 1995 confrontation between Shell and Greenpeace over the disposal of the Brent Spar oil 
platform in the North Sea has come to be regarded as a turning point in corporate citizenship, 
when business leaders awoke to the power of civic society and public calls for them to be more 
responsible. In time the confrontation with NGOs over Sakhalin would come to be regarded as 
an even more seminal moment in the history of the corporation and its relations with society. 
By delaying loans and guarantees from government-backed agencies and giving the Russian 
government a reason to suspend the project, environmental campaigning cost the company 
thousands of times more money in assets and lost future earnings than Brent Spar, and poses a 
greater challenge to the very core of Shell’s business. This challenge is twofold. 
 
First, it involves the asymmetrical pressures from civic society. Currently the international oil 
companies (IOCs) face far higher pressure from critical media, active civic society and informed 
communities in their home countries than many of the nationally owned or promoted oil 
companies from Brazil, China, Malaysia and the Russian Federation, among others. 
Consequently they are pushed to adopt higher standards and more quickly criticized when 
failing to meet them than national companies, with real financial implications. This poses a 
strategic challenge for IOCs that could mean operating in entirely new ways in its community 
relations and government relations, such as supporting the development of civic society and 
critical media in countries with oil reserves, and working toward improved international 
regulations on social and environmental issues, including international mechanisms for 
enforcement. As a matter of long-term survival, international oil companies might sensibly 
support an international convention on corporate accountability.  
 
The second part of the challenge involves the future opportunities for energy generation. In 
light of resource nationalism, Shell and some other IOCs have begun to focus on the niche of 
projects that require the most sophisticated technology to secure oil from difficult regions such 
as the Arctic or unconventional sources such as Canadian oil sands and liquefied coal. The 
problems with this are obvious. Getting oil from sand or coal consumes huge amounts of 
energy, and thus increases the pollution greatly, while going into pristine environments like the 
Arctic will alarm many public organizations.  
 
In the short term the company may be able to pursue this strategy due to the high oil price and 
security concerns in the United States and Canada about energy independence. But in the long 
term, oil price fluctuations, the growing cost of carbon and growing awareness that the 
changing climate is itself a security threat, will likely derail it. 
 
In a BBC debate, Solar Century director Jeremy Leggett asked Shell’s CEO Jeroen van der Veer 
whether it was possible for the company to go into the Arctic and oil sands, and the world’s 
atmosphere to stay below the 450 parts per million of carbon identified as a crucial threshold by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). When pushed, he replied, “we are not 
responsible for deciding the energy mix of the world” (BBC 2007). This is reminiscent of the 
stance Shell took in the mid-1990s on involvement in public matters, before the Brent Spar and 
Ogoniland, Nigeria, episodes led them to accept their influence and express an intention to use 
it responsibly. Clearly everyone is partly responsible for deciding the energy mix of the world, 
with some more influential than others. Companies like Shell have major influence in political 
processes and the economics that frame political discourse. Chief executive officers (CEOs) in 
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such companies with sufficient awareness and courage must face these difficult conundrums to 
find a long-term viable strategy. 
 
James Leaton of WWF thinks there is a way forward. “Oil companies are about project 
management, technology and marketing, to supply liquid hydrocarbons for transport fuels. 
Unless they start putting these skills and resources to more sustainable options, companies like 
Shell who are investing in more carbon-intensive fuels, will be stranded in a carbon-constrained 
world.” 
Publish What You Pay 
Since the formation of the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) network, the main industry it has 
focused on, extractives, has experienced an unprecedented boom. In 2005 alone, public mining 
companies experienced a 72 per cent increase in their total capitalization from 2004, with net 
profits increasing by 59 per cent, representing an increase of $45 billion. This was good news for 
their shareholders, who received $18 billion in 2005, up 82 per cent from the previous year. The 
increase in profits being made by the major oil and gas producing companies was also 
extraordinary. America’s five “super majors” reported record profits of $342.4 billion between 
2001 and 2006 (PWC 2006). During this time the evidence of corruption continued to increase, 
while most anti-corruption prosecutions of business people faltered, and all the main goals of 
the PWYP network remained unfulfilled. Today, corruption in Africa is costing the continent 
nearly $150 billion a year, according to the African Union (Webb 2008). 
 
Despite this general picture of a global boom of resource consumption racing ahead, while 
policy implementation on corruption and good governance stumbles behind, there is evidence 
that the PWYP network had some impact on policy making that may eventually reduce levels of 
corruption and improve accountable governance. 
 
The network helped reshape the political opportunities for civic society action on good 
governance and corruption in four key ways: raising the agenda, framing the agenda by 
identifying agency, inspiring processes for engagement, and influencing processes that might 
regulate. Each will be discussed in turn, before looking at the failures to achieve the specific 
policy goals of the network.  
 
First, PWYP raised the agenda. The levels of mobilization the network facilitated and 
represented has made corruption, in particular, a key international policy issue. Andre Standing 
(2007:1) explains this shift in emphasis, in the African context: 
 
In the past few years, loans by the World Bank Group, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Development Bank, among others, 
have been premised on the need for anti-corruption ‘conditionalities’. Mining 
companies are reporting to shareholders and investors that avoiding 
corruption is critical to mitigating their risks, and diverse African 
governments, from Madagascar to Nigeria, now claim that fighting 
corruption is one of their top priorities in better managing resource 
exploitation and attracting foreign investment. In short, fighting corruption 
has swiftly become one of the key ideas in the effort to make resource 
exploitation contribute to development in Africa instead of being a source of 
potential harm. 
 
Second, PWYP helped reframe the issue, by identifying corporations as key agents that should 
bear responsibility. During the 1990s, the World Bank emphasized public sector corruption as 
part of its good governance agenda and “depicted the private sector as one of the primary 
victims” (Standing 2007:1). By 2005, some in the Bank were acknowledging that companies 
operating in weak or transition states were not passive victims but active parties to corruption 
(Kaufmann and Vicente 2005). “Corruption is not only the abuse of public office for private 
gain, but also the use of public office for private gain by third parties: the grabbing hand of the 
state is joined by the grabbing hands of private companies” (Standing 2007:1). This was a shift 
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toward the way the problem was framed by members of PWYP, who chose to focus on the 
responsibilities of those who make the various payments to governments. Thus the network 
had opened up a new political opportunity to influence corruption and good governance 
through corporate practice.  
 
Third, this influence meant that PWYP helped shape the creation of new processes for 
organizations to engage on these issues. The NGOs’ role in subsequent policy processes was 
expanded and institutionalized, particularly through the creation of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. The PWYP campaigns led the UK government to announce the creation 
of the EITI at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in September 2002. The EITI is a 
multistakeholder initiative that addresses how to promote the transparency of government 
revenue streams (“publish what you receive”). Members of EITI agree on a broad set of 
principles, including the need for double disclosure between companies and governments to 
allow for figure comparison. The EITI has garnered the support of international institutional 
investors with combined trillions of dollars under managements, such as Fidelity Investments 
and Merrill Lynch Investment Managers (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005). Statements from 
delegates at successive G8 meetings since 2003 have also expressed support for the initiative.  
 
The EITI is explored further below, but aspects of its functioning that relate to civic society are 
key in understanding how civic society mobilization ostensibly helped institutionalize and 
protect such mobilization. NGOs are involved in the governance of the EITI, holding a fifth of 
the seats on the board (other board groups include producer and investor governments, 
investors and companies). In addition, EITI enshrined in its principles for participating 
governments that civic society plays an important role in achieving good governance, including 
the exposing and punishing of corruption. Combined with a diverse international group of 
participants, including many with financial importance for the participating countries, this 
meant that by 2008 EITI was helping protect the political space for civic society action. For 
example, the government of Gabon, which is an oil-rich country, banned 22 NGOs, including 
members of PWYP, for criticizing the way in which state resources were being spent. Gabonese 
Interior Minister Andre Mba Obame said that four coalitions made up of anti-corruption, anti-
poverty and environmental campaign groups had been banned for interfering in the country’s 
politics. PWYP said the suspension contravened Gabon’s membership of the EITI, and worked 
to bring global pressure to bear on the government. The ban was lifted within a week, an action 
which some NGOs in Gabon hailed as a sign that civic society would continue to play a role in 
holding the government to account (Reuters 2008). This is key, given that addressing corruption 
“depends fundamentally on the presence of independent voices and commentators,” according 
to Kirsty Drew, of trade union anti-corruption network UNICORN (TI 2008).  
The fourth area where PWYP influenced the political opportunities for action was its 
contribution to the pressure for the establishment of mechanisms that could regulate 
governments worldwide. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 31 October 2003 (Resolution 58/4). The 
agreement of such a convention was not an explicit aim of PWYP, but its campaigning for 
government action helped speed the negotiations. Five years after its agreement, no process had 
been agreed by which governments could be assessed for their compliance with the convention. 
Lilian Ekeanyanwu, chairperson of Nigeria’s Zero Corruption Coalition and a member of 
Transparency International Nigeria, explained at the UNCAC conference that “[m]any of us, 
from countries where this is a life or death issue, will be heading home having heard little more 
than rhetoric“ (TI 2008). 
 
Beyond these broad changes in policy contexts, PWYP has not achieved its initial policy aims, 
each of which would involve the British government adopting new legislation to compel 
different parts of the financial sector to behave differently in the transparency they require from 
corporations. The main policy aim that launched the campaign was for stock market listing 
rules to be changed so all listed companies would need to disclose what they paid to 
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governments. No progress has been made either directly with the stock markets or the UK 
government on this matter.  
 
A second policy task relates to methods for reporting on such payments. PWYP has called for 
new accounting standards that would require the disagregation of payments to governments so 
that investors and other interested parties could see where the funds are going. A key focus for 
this has been the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which promotes mandatory 
standards globally for “profit-oriented” bodies. It is a non-governmental body independent of 
formal accountability to governments and intergovernmental bodies (IFRGEY 2006:70). Now 
globally influential, its stated aim is “to develop, in the public interest, a...set of high 
quality...enforceable global accounting standards” (Gallhofer and Haslam 2007:12). 
 
PWYP decided to engage with the IASB during the development of the International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) 8 Operating Segments, a document that would help integrate aspects 
of US accounting practice with other accounting standards. PWYP managed to marshal the 
most number of submissions to any such standard development process of the IASB (Gallhofer 
and Haslam 2007). An advisor to PWYP, Richard Murphy, formerly with KPMG explained that: 
 
After 20 to 30 letters...a head of steam was building up...[we]wrote to 
indicate...we wanted to meet...we were happy to arrange a...visit to take them 
to Africa...to see the scale of the issue and talk to local tax officials. The reply 
came...the relevant person was going on maternity leave. We wrote...that 
surely we must have a meeting...the answer came back that we are not going 
to talk. There was no constructive engagement... We realised there was no real 
point in the consultative process (Gallhofer and Haslam 2007). 
 
He said that they had already decided to adopt an approach that would not require detailed 
disagregation of payments to governments. In addition he claimed there was “an organized 
counter campaign” to encourage submissions to the IASB to challenge the calls from PWYP 
participants: 
 
The number of letters in favour of...IFRS8...jumped up dramatically after the 
flurry of submissions from [PWYP]. There have never been so many 
submissions in favour...we still managed to get over half the submissions but 
only just...IASB considered all our letters to be the same. This was not true. 
Each party submitting was encouraged to include their own issues...several 
did (Gallhofer and Haslam 2007). 
 
The existence of the network was used by a resistant organization to actually undermine the 
collective influence of its members. The implications are that PWYP would have benefited from 
more supporters in the wider accountancy profession without formal ties to the PWYP network 
itself becoming engaged in the IASB. After years of attempts from PWYP to engage, the trustees 
of IASB finally met them in July 2007 for initial discussions.  
 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) conclude that the resistance of the IASB to PWYP highlights the 
political nature of processes masquerading as technical: 
 
The IASB may claim to be neutral and ‘merely’ a technically/scientifically 
expert, but actually it is political. In making some things visible and others 
not, it has consequences beyond the confines of a narrow economics. In 
ostensibly serving the latter...it substantively fails to realize its potential as 
information for democracy and society as well as for economic resource 
allocation. 
They suggest that either the IASB’s understanding of its public purpose is “less than sound” or 
it knowingly disguises underlying commercial interests of the accountancy profession that are 
“diverging from reasonable notions of the public interest” (Gallhofer and Haslam 2007). To help 
expose the political nature of the work at IASB, PWYP lobbied the European Parliament on the 
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issue. In November 2007 the parliament voted for a new international accounting standard 
requiring oil, gas and mining companies to report payments to governments on a country-by-
country basis. 
 
In addition to calling on governments to intervene with stock markets and accounting 
standards bodies, PWYP was campaigning to see action from governments within existing legal 
frameworks, in particular within the context of obligations under the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). On this there has been complete failure. Transparency International 
publishes a report card once a year on how the OECD convention is being applied. It showed 
there are very few investigations and prosecutions on business bribery in at least half of OECD 
countries. The United Kingdom was one of the worst ranked for starting investigations but 
failing to prosecute. Of the 15 foreign bribery investigations in 2007 and the four in 2006, the 
United Kingdom brought one prosecution (Webb 2008). 
 
“It is hypocritical that OECD–based companies continue to bribe across the globe, while their 
governments pay lip-service to enforcing the law,” said David Nussbaum, former Chief 
Executive of Transparency International (TI 2006). The OECD itself has been critical of the 
United Kingdom’s implementation of the convention. A high-profile instance of non-
compliance is the al-Yamamah case. The UK government cancelled an investigation into a major 
arms deal with Saudi Arabia involving BAE Systems on national security grounds. It was “seen 
by many as a national scandal setting back the UK’s reputation in the international arena” 
(Webb 2008). The case is still in the UK’s High Court, which ruled in 2007 that the case should 
be reopened. 
 
Given the lack of progress in these areas, it is not surprising that PWYP participants focused on 
the creation of the EITI as a key success of the network. They even link to it from the central 
frame of the PWYP homepage. The strengths and weakness of the EITI in encouraging the 
transparency of government revenues that PWYP seeks is important to explore.  
 
EITI is not the governmental response that PWYP called for. It does not focus on new 
regulations on international corporations, but provides a voluntary system for governments 
and businesses to improve the transparency of payments related to extractive industries. PWYP 
was founded on a rejection of the possibility that voluntary action would be sustainable, EITI on 
the proposition that a voluntary approach could deliver benefits for participants.  
 
A success of the EITI has been to attract many candidate countries and supporting companies to 
commit to greater transparency, and to begin working out mechanisms for this. However, by 
the end of 2007 only a couple of the supporting companies had published information on their 
governmental payments and no candidate country has been endorsed for the transparency of its 
accounts.  
 
Despite EITI being founded on a concept of voluntary change that PWYP had rejected at the 
outset, the latter has not been completely critical of it. This is partly because EITI is one of the 
most active mechanisms on the issue, but also because the existence of EITI provides the 
members of PWYP with greater political opportunities for their action. By giving NGOs a place 
in its organizational structure and role on its board, EITI provides access to higher policy levels 
than some NGOs would have had before. In addition, it provides new means for protecting 
civic society action at national levels, by requiring countries that seek endorsement from EITI to 
respect civic society rights to information, association and advocacy; and by mobilizing 
powerful groups in the defence of specific NGOs when governments retaliate against their 
campaigning on transparency-related issues. This was illustrated in early 2008 when the 
government of Gabon suspended a number of NGOs, including some members of PWYP, for 
being critical of the government’s use of oil revenues. Within a week of PWYP and EITI 
secretariats and members expressing concern, the country revoked its ban. 
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The fact that PWYP members benefit from EITI’s existence suggests some confluence of 
interests between the instigators and funders of these initiatives. PWYP and EITI share a similar 
approach in four areas, each of which could be contested for its inability to promote governance 
to reduce global and national inequalities. 
 
First, neither EITI or PWYP have sufficiently engaged the newly emerged powers, particularly 
India and China, which are major investors across the global South. Transparency 
International’s 2006 Bribe Payers Index illustrates one aspect of the problem, with China and 
India the worst performers. Neither country was involved in EITI, nor did PWYP have any 
members from them. Both organizations are based on the involvement of civic society, which 
would present a difficulty for China, as well as other countries where civic society does not play 
a role in policy discourse. “The role of the big emerging economies” was identified by the EITI’s 
policy advisor as the first strategic issue to address in the years ahead (Rich 2008). One can 
question why it is only now that the role of these countries is being discussed. Rather than an 
emerging issue, it has been a central one in many countries for many years. It was clear from the 
analyses of the mid-1990s of trade-related social and environmental problems that South-South 
trade and investment was a key factor, and interventions based on Western civil societies, 
consumers and corporations were not comprehensive (Bendell 1995).23 
 
Given questions about the legitimacy of multistakeholder processes in influencing the foreign 
trade practices of countries like China, one answer may be to explore new or enhanced 
intergovernmental arrangements. A lack of focus on lobbying for such intergovernmental 
mechanisms is a second area of similarity between EITI and PWYP. The absence of such 
mechanisms is considered by many scholars to be a result of the power of corporations on the 
foreign and trade relations policies of national governments (Bendell 2004). This led to a 
defeatism among many civic society organizations about the possibility of encouraging new 
rules for global trade (Murphy and Bendell 1999), which was reflected by some of the 
participants in PWYP. EITI is, after all, an alternative form of global governance mechanism and 
its relationship to intergovernmental processes is currently unclear, beyond general support 
from the G8 (which is not a formal intergovernmental body like the United Nations). Despite 
the difficult intergovernmental situation, the UN Convention Against Corruption was agreed, 
although, as discussed above, it does not yet deliver an enforcement mechanism. It is a moot 
point what might have been achieved if the efforts were placed on making this a more 
enforceable convention.  
 
A third area of common approach between the initiatives is the proposition, perhaps 
assumption, that transparency can deliver good governance. This is questionable, given the 
analysis of countries where there is transparent corruption. In the Philippines the media has 
consistently revealed instances of corrupt politicians arranging payments for themselves in 
return for award contracts for building roads and airports, and other activities. Inquiries in the 
Senate have also helped reveal the level and routine nature of corruption, and how debates in 
and around government focus on what is an acceptable level of corruption rather than its 
outright condemnation. Despite this transparency, little has changed in the governance of the 
country. In the most recent circumstance under the government of Gloria Arroyo, this appears 
to be because the various sectors of society that could challenge such practices—the church, 
courts, military, police and civic society—are politicized and have financial self-interests in 
maintaining the current political order. Transparency is the focus of both initiatives because it 
appears as a first step toward good governance, and because it appears as a more technical 
rather than political measure. However, to achieve good governance requires dealing with 
issues of power and how the information can be then used. PWYP avoid this issue as a result of 
the interests of its members, who seek to maintain an apolitical profile for purposes of their 
charitable status and broad memberships.  
                                                          
23 For instance, in the timber trade, by the early 1990s the deforestation in Southeast Asia was due to demand from consumers in other 
parts of Asia rather than the West. So voluntary responsible purchasing of timber from Western markets presented a fundamentally 
limited response to the deforestation problem (Bendell 1995). 
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Fourth, both initiatives focus on extractive industries. However, research shows that today 
corruption is most prevalent in the building of power stations, roads and airports, hydroelectric 
dams and waste management systems, as well as in basic services such as justice, health, 
education and energy supplies. Corruption in public procurement in many countries is also 
widespread (Webb 2008). This suggests that EITI should not be a main focus for PWYP. 
However, extractive industries provide a clear and visible link to the constituencies of PWYP 
memberships, through the involvement of companies headquartered in the West, such as the oil 
and mining majors. In addition, the social and environmental impacts of such projects are 
highly visible and provide a connection between the broader corruption issue and the specific 
concerns of participant charities, such as humanitarian action, deforestation and so on.  
 
These four areas of overlap, which can be questioned in their effectiveness in delivering good 
governance of business and investment, suggest that they are both the result of the same 
structural factors that relate to the power of corporate interests over foreign affairs, the limited 
ability of civic society groups to tackle causes of societal problems free from interests of their 
own organizational mandates and funding streams, resulting in a need to brand their policy 
“asks” (or policies asked for by NGOs). Meanwhile corruption grows worldwide. One of the 
first countries to be engaged by EITI and profiled by PWYP is Nigeria. In 2008 Transparency 
International reported Nigeria as still one of the world’s most corrupt nations (Webb 2008). For 
instance, in December 2007 Nuhu Ribadu, who had chaired Nigeria’s powerful Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission for the past three years, lost his job. Claiming to have recovered 
about $1 billion in embezzled funds, Ribadu stepped down unwillingly. He had been 
investigating a former governor of Delta state considered close to the new Nigerian president. 
“It may be that for anti-corruption workers in Africa, if you do your job too well, it can get you 
fired,” commented Toby Webb (2008). 
Trade Justice Movement 
The TJM points to the change in UK company law as its key impact on UK public policy. 
Although it played an important role in this process by helping to mobilize people through its 
NGO members, the corporate accountability agenda had not been the central focus for TJM or 
the reason for its creation. The CORE coalition was created for that purpose. Instead, TJM was 
initially created to organize what could be called “high-street NGOs”, large and well known to 
many people in the United Kingdom, to continue and expand the agenda and tactics pursued 
by the Jubilee 2000 coalition, which focused on debt cancellation for poor countries. It played a 
key role in the late 1990s in bringing thousands of people on to the streets in the cities hosting 
the major summits of institutions it considered responsible for the debt situation and its 
impacts, specifically the World Bank, the IMF and the G8. TJM involved many of the same 
organizations in the Jubilee campaign, and sought to apply similar pressure on another aspect 
of the global economy—international trade agreements. Individual members of the public, 
media and protesters were already making the connections, with the protests at the 1999 WTO 
ministerial meeting in Seattle occurring a year before the TJM was formed. Therefore the TJM 
impact on public policy should really be assessed on the basis of the framework of trade 
agreements that has arisen post-Seattle. On those terms, the TJM has failed to make an impact. 
Worse, it could be argued that a historic opportunity to embrace and organize an upwelling of 
public interest and commitment at the turn of the millennium was lost by the members of TJM. 
Both points are explained below. 
 
The WTO plays an important, though not encompassing, role in international trade rules. The 
protests in Seattle and the collapse of those talks amid resistance from delegates from the global 
South meant that a new, ostensibly more developmental, agenda had to be found. This resulted 
in the Doha agenda for future negotiations, which had still not been completed by 2008. 
Therefore the argument from TJM that development has been made central to international 
trade policy at WTO is questionable.  
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During the 2005 WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, there were street battles between 
protestors and police; the conference goers were protected by barriers. The ministerial was 
considered by those within the barriers to be a greater success than the meeting in Cancún two 
years earlier, which had ended without agreement. Pascal Lamy, the director-general of the 
WTO, said that an agreement to end rich countries’ subsidizing of agricultural exports by 2013 
would help to conclude the round and move negotiations forward. However, many activists 
within TJM called the agreement a failure for the poor. Steve Tibbett from Action Aid said, “the 
WTO has served up a diet of peanuts, waffle and fudge” as richer countries continued to push 
for access to low-income country markets and stronger rights for their companies, while 
refusing to rapidly reduce their subsidizing of agricultural exports (Elliott 2005). Some 
commentators argued that the new economic heavyweights India and Brazil helped ensure a 
resolution to the talks by putting pressure on low-income countries. In addition, a new 
procedure of plurilateral negotiations was agreed, whereby groups of countries would enter 
into future negotiations. This is an attempt to speed future negotiations, but in a way that may 
further undermine the multilateral character of the process.  
 
One of the successes that TJM points to are the delays in rich countries obtaining agreements on 
liberalizing finance and investment via the WTO. However, this fails to mention how the forum 
for rich countries, which includes the United Kingdom, has now shifted to bilateral agreements 
to pursue its aims for liberalization of finance and investment. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, the EU has taken on ever greater leadership in trade policy through negotiating 
Economic Partnership Agreements. By 2008 dozens of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
had signed trade deals with the EU that included agreements on issues such as investment and 
trade in services. By 2002 it was already clear to trade analysts that other mechanisms than the 
WTO would be used by corporate interests to seek changes in regulatory frameworks, including 
through the use of bilateral and regional agreements (Petersen 2002). Given this understanding, 
one might have expected a major mobilization around EU policy-making processes, to ensure 
they would be open to civic society scrutiny and pressure. However, the initial consultations 
from the European Commission on requiring disclosure of the funding and activities of 
lobbyists did not receive a major response from trade campaigners, including the TJM 
secretariat, and a voluntary register was adopted by the EU. The European branch of TJM 
member FoE did take a lead in creating a network to pressure for greater disclosure in future.24  
 
This “success” is, however, about resisting rather than advancing an agenda on these matters. A 
member of TJM expressed his sense of the challenge: “How successful have we been in all that? 
Not very so far, but we’ve only been working five years, and it’s a bit of a big thing to try to 
overthrow the neoliberal economic order—but we’re getting there.” 
This economic order, and particularly the global financial system, is recognized by many NGOs 
as posing problems for the reduction of poverty and the achievement of greater equality. There 
are important development concerns arising from tax havens, currency speculation, leveraged 
buy-outs, short-selling stocks and near-term focused asset management. Tax evasion and 
offshore banking secrecy cost developing country governments up to $500 billion a year in lost 
revenues. Currency speculation at over a trillion dollars a day has destabilized currencies so 
that there is a mismatch between loans priced in rich country currencies and repayments in 
domestic currencies. The world’s top 20 banks account for 80 per cent of this currency 
speculation, and thus benefit disproportionately from the use of this power to influence 
currency prices.  
 
The use of huge loans by private equity firms to enable them to buy out publicly traded 
companies is another challenge to the social performance of business and trade. The main 
criticism is that these firms load the companies they take over with the huge debts required for 
that take-over, sell off different parts of the business and increase cash flow to generate 
dividends, and then sell the indebted company back to the stock market, where it is bought up 
                                                          
24 See the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation at the EU (ALTER–EU), at www.alter-eu.org. 
UNRISD PROGRAMME ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
PAPER NUMBER 31 
42 
by, among others, pension funds. For instance, the private equity partners who took over the 
British retailer Debenhams, increased the company’s debt from £100 million to £1.9 billion, paid 
themselves dividends of £1.3 billion, tripling their investment in just over two years (Russell 
2007). 
 
Short selling is the practice of borrowing shares with a promise to give them back at a later 
time. The trader sells them when the share price is high and then buys them back—to fulfil the 
promise—after that price falls, thus making a profit from a fall in share price. Many hedge 
funds have used short selling to create huge profits, and come under attack from regulators, 
pension funds and business executives who complain about how they undermine planning for 
the long term. This compounds a situation of near-term focused asset management. The average 
stock ownership period has fallen from two years in 1998 to 14.6 months in 2000 and just 9.4 
months in 2007. Some major companies have seen their share prices fall by 30 per cent in a 
single week after hedge funds have targeted them (Schiller 2006). The problem for the social 
dimensions of business and trade is that this short-term pressure does not encourage companies 
to plan for the long term and thus invest in research, staff development, community relations 
and so on. Hedge fund managers can take 20 per cent of the profits generated in trade; for 
example, a top hedge fund manager, Steve Cohen, earned around a billion dollars a year.25 
Cumulatively these earnings draw upon the collective wealth of the asset owners and 
employees, and thus represent a massive transfer of wealth from the many to the few.  
 
Given this systemic influence on the global economy, merely slowing down the policy agendas 
of some of the major financial firms is not very significant. The 2005 G8 summit reaffirmed its 
commitment to global financial liberalization even though many developing countries 
questioned the benefits of capital liberalization; particularly those, like China, Chile and 
Malaysia, that had not liberalized their financial sectors and had managed to ride out regional 
financial crises. No commitment was forthcoming from the UK government on a new approach 
to the financial system on the issues mentioned above, and none was being formulated or 
requested by TJM, apart from some reports on specific issues like tax evasion by its members, 
such as Christian Aid. Even the Western financial crisis, brought on by a crash in confidence in 
financial derivatives in the real estate sector in 2007, did not lead to initiatives from TJM on 
what an economic justice agenda would look like for finance. This is surprising if one 
remembers how a campaign on a financial issue—poor country debt—inspired the creation of 
TJM.  
 
Another claim of success made by the TJM was the increasing attention given by trade 
negotiators to eliminating export subsidies by rich countries. The concern expressed by some 
British international development NGOs, Southern governments and large agricultural 
producers is that they are unable to compete on price with subsidized products from rich 
countries that enter their markets, nor sell their products freely in rich country markets. In 2005 
an agreement to include this issue in the future was reached at the WTO. The development 
NGO position was questioned by some, such as Vandana Shiva, who focused more on small-
scale and environmentally appropriate solutions to food supply (Shiva 2002). 
 
An awareness of the resource dependency of the long-distance trading of large-scale farming of 
cash crops, and an argument for more local production and trade, underpins the criticism of the 
development NGO position on market access. As the implications of climate change for 
agricultural production become more widely understood, particularly the growing cost of oil-
dependent agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and the cost of transportation, this analysis is 
more widely recognized (Celsias 2008). Consequently any policy changes that encourage more 
mechanized forms of production and longer transportation of supplies conflict with attempts to 
promote climate change mitigation and adaptation.  
 
                                                          
25 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_A._Cohen, accessed in June 2008. 
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Another dimension to the criticism of the market access argument of development NGOs is that 
it is unclear how such changes would deal with the fundamental drivers of hunger and 
malnutrition. These drivers are disputed but are generally understood to include the quantity 
and quality of food, levels of income and income inequality in society, and the diversity of both 
food supplies and incomes available to communities. Greater access to Northern markets for 
developing country producers will benefit those companies able to take advantage of such 
trading opportunities. However, this will not affect the poor producers, who often experience 
rising prices for land and inputs as commercial cash cropping grows in their locale. 
Liberalization of trade can generate inequality, which can be a key driver of hunger. 
Concluding a discussion of the increasing industrialization and internationalization of 
agriculture in step with trade liberalization, African civil society organizations at the World 
Social Forum 2007 in Nairobi, Kenya, in January stated: 
 
We reject these new foreign systems that will encourage Africa’s land and 
water to be privatised for growing inappropriate export crops, biofuels and 
carbon sinks, instead of food for our own people. We pledge to intensify our 
work for food sovereignty by conserving our own seed and enhancing our 
traditional organic systems of agriculture, in order to meet the uncertainties 
and challenges that will be faced by present and future generations. 
Agricultural innovation must be farmer-led, responding to local needs and 
sustainability. We celebrate Africa’s wealth and heritage of seed, knowledge 
and innovation. We will resist these misguided, top-down but heavily-funded 
initiatives from the North, which show little or no understanding or respect 
for our complex systems. We ask that we be allowed to define our own path 
forward.26 
 
These NGOs highlight the insecurity of food supply that comes from being reliant on foods 
transported over long distances that require large amounts of oil inputs, and that fluctuate in 
affordability depending on incomes, supply and demand. They suggest that food security 
should be the policy goal, and which comes from individuals and communities attaining a 
diversity of modes of food supply. This involves a mix of foods from communities producing 
their own with minimal external inputs, from having the funds to buy them at market, and 
from foods from outside the community that have been sustainably produced and transported. 
This implies an approach to economic development as a whole that emphasizes economic 
security as much as efficiency, innovation and continual expansion. 
 
The call from African civic society suggests that British development NGOs might have focused 
on matters other than agricultural trade liberalization. In early 2007, as food prices worldwide 
rocketed due to problems with production combined with spiralling demand from Asia, so 
TJM’s criticism of rich country policies that kept down international prices for foods like rice, 
corn and wheat, seemed redundant. Instead, any policy that would keep prices down, including 
export subsidies, would help to alleviate the global problem with food prices.  
 
That TJM’s policy proscriptions could lose their appropriateness due to these changes in 
circumstances, which were widely foreseen by experts in sustainable development, such as the 
World Watch Institute (2004), suggests a lack of a coherent philosophy about the root cause of 
malnutrition and maldevelopment. The mission of TJM reads like a long list of specific policy 
concerns rather than an overarching analysis of the nature and cause of maldevelopment. In 
relation to agriculture it is not clear what the universal principles are. For instance, when 
referring to poor countries’ agricultural policies, the TJM alludes to principles of national 
sovereignty, arguing that governments should be able to set their own policies and not be 
instructed by international bodies. Yet when referring to rich countries, the TJM argues that 
national policies on export subsidies are wrong and seeks an international ruling that would 
override them. On matters other than agriculture, such as corporate accountability, TJM also 
                                                          
26 This statement is accessible on a variety of NGO web sites, such as www.grain.org/g/?id=179. 
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calls for an internationalist approach where universal principles would override national 
sovereignty.  
 
A lack of a cohering political vision also means that the NGOs in TJM did not relate effectively 
to the upwelling of public interest in systemic critiques of globalization in the late 1990s and 
early twenty-first century. TJM claims it “has established a reputation for public mobilization in 
support of its goals” and cites that over 25,000 people “filled Whitehall at an all-night vigil”.27 
However, it is important to remember that in Genoa in 2001, over 100,000 people protested at 
the G8. Only a few thousand were organized by the TJM, and in general there was little 
evidence of any connection between the people protesting and the NGOs who were focused on 
lobbying the politicians and speaking to the media. Given that absence on the ground, the 
protestors were approached and recruited by traditional Left-wing organizations, such as the 
Socialist Workers Party and its front group called Globalise Resistance. The upwelling of protest 
were described as anti-globalization or anti-capitalist movements. That neither phrase appeared 
on the TJM web site highlights the fact that TJM members did not feel comfortable working 
with an explicitly political framing of the problems. The subsequently popular term of Global 
Justice Movement was mentioned only once, in passing. This lack of connection to the wider 
movement of individuals critiquing global capitalism was illustrated by a fall-out between TJM 
and the organizing committee for the European Social Forum in 2004.28 
 
In the absence of a groundswell of activists, the TJM used another means of generating mass 
participation—celebrities. The Live 8 musical event, held to coincide with the G8 summit in 
Scotland, helped create media attention and public participation, but also reshaped the message 
being conveyed to the world. The message became one of charity not justice, with the powerful 
leaders of the world asked to help the unfortunate rather than being challenged to correct their 
own countries’ involvement in oppressive trading and financial relations with poor countries. 
Many of the celebrities congratulated the politicians, although the movement on trade issues 
was non-existent, and the debt cancellation deal was not comprehensive.  
 
The lack of connection to grassroots activists, absence of a coherent political philosophy, the 
ease with which celebrities could influence the message and the lack of impact on public policy 
suggests that the Trade Justice Movement is not actually a movement in the true sense of the 
word. Perhaps the financial crisis that broke in 2008 may change that by giving TJM member 
NGOs a political opportunity to advance more radical critiques of and proposals for the 
financial system. Time will tell whether they manage to bridge their institutional NGO concerns 
by engaging at the grassroots level as a new wave of activism calling for financial justice rose in 
2009. 
Collective impacts on global inequality 
Several themes emerge from the preceding discussion on the impacts of the different networks. 
First, the policy goals of the networks are conservative, even when compared to the nature of 
the problem defined by the networks and their participants. For instance, it is not certain that 
the greater disclosure of corporate activities sought by PWYP and CORE would actually deliver 
a change in irresponsible behaviour. The agenda is conservative largely because the NGOs 
identify policy goals that they think could be attainable within existing power structures and 
past experience. However, another moderating influence may be the sources of funding for 
participant organizations, including governments, corporations and established middle-class 
individuals; concerns with the restrictions on political action due to the NGO’s charitable status; 
and the class of the NGO professionals themselves, many of whom will work in government or 
corporate management at some stage in their career.  
 
                                                          
27 www.tjm.org.uk. 
28 An open letter from NGOs to the organizing committee was posted on the Indymedia web site at www.indymedia.org.uk/ 
en/2004/09/297118.html. 
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Second, the achievement of these conservative policy goals is limited. Only 3.9 per cent of 
survey respondents reported that public policy changes on the issues the network was 
campaigning on were “substantive” without further qualification. Another 53.9 per cent 
considered that such policy changes were “substantive but didn’t sufficiently address structural 
issues”, and 30.8 per cent that they were “superficial”. The remaining 11.5 per cent reported no 
changes in policy. PWYP and TJM cannot point to many concrete policy outcomes that align 
with their original campaign goals. SIN has not achieved a major change in ECGD policies and 
practices. The CORE coalition has achieved changes in the law, but with no clarity about how 
these will be interpreted and implemented.  
 
Third, when these policy goals are achieved, it appears to exhaust rather than energize the 
network. Since the change in UK company law, CORE’s funding and participation tailed off, it 
lost staff and ceased campaigning. Some NGOs expressed they felt they had gone as far as they 
could within their own organizations on a corporate reform agenda. After Shell’s controlling 
stake in Sakhalin II was revoked, SIN ceased to be as active internationally, and apart from 
continuing court battles with ECGD, UK NGOs left it to Russian NGOs to continue the battle 
with the new controllers, Gazprom.  
 
Fourth, when the policy goals of the networks were achieved, the translation of these policy 
innovations into the practice of business, investment or trade has been minimal, at least in the 
time horizon of this project. For over 18 months the UK government did not provide guidance, 
let alone a standard, for what the new law on corporate social reporting and directors’ duties 
actually would mean. This leaves it up to companies to determine what they think the law 
means, as well as the courts, when a case is finally brought that uses this legislation. That highly 
paid corporate lawyers will likely influence the substance of new laws on corporate 
accountability, through an effective defence of their clients, is not a positive reflection on the 
democratic process.  
 
Fifth, the existence of numerous networks on aspects of economic policy has not made a generic 
impact on the economic policy agenda in the United Kingdom. The early twenty-first century 
has witnessed a continuing emphasis on the liberalization of trade and finance at home and 
abroad, in pursuit of the illogical aim of continual economic growth within a finite natural 
environment. The inability to shift the broad agenda could be the result of a reluctance to 
elucidate a comprehensive political analysis of the problems with and causes of inequality. 
Although one of the networks calls itself a movement for justice, the networks have not clearly 
identified themselves as part of a common effort for economic justice, or articulated how they 
relate to the concept of such a movement that has spread worldwide—the Global Justice 
Movement. The importance of this gulf is only accentuated by the global financial crisis that 
developed in 2008. The ability of these networks to enable NGOs to develop common critiques 
and push common proposals may determine the relevance of these NGOs to the emergence of a 
new global financial order that will shape inequalities for years to come. 
Network Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of NGOs engaging directly in policy advocacy is one that preoccupies many 
policy makers, advocates and scholars (Van Rooy 2004). The civil servants interviewed for this 
research expressed a variety of perspectives on the validity of NGOs to the policy process 
involved. A common criticism was that the NGOs lacked the mandate from those on behalf of 
whom they claimed to be working, or the importance of policy processes balancing a wider set 
of interests than the ones the NGOs represented. For instance, one civil servant remarked that 
“some NGOs are effectively single-issue NGOs. The Save the Whales campaign has one 
objective: to save whales. They can put their blinkers on and ignore everything else that’s going 
on. We can’t do that. We have to get the balance right across all the issues.”  
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Given that global inequality is the background to this study, it is important to reflect further on 
the possible inequalities in political representation in public policy processes, and how civic 
networks can reduce or perhaps even compound those inequalities. 
 
There are five criteria by which a voice can be considered to have value in political 
deliberations: relevant experience, expertise, novelty, content and the extent to which a person 
expressing an opinion is affected by the matter at hand in a way that could create significant 
disadvantage to themselves (the “dependent affectedness”, of a voice) (Bendell 2006). Research 
on NGO advocacy shows that many NGOs, their critics, government and intergovernmental 
policy makers often conflate these different bases for quality or validity of voice (Bendell 2006). 
This “confuses the debate and increases the likelihood that criticisms will be used to exclude 
rather than structure the involvement of dissenting voices” (Edwards 2003:1). This section 
discusses the way the NGO networks perform in terms of these bases of validity.  
 
From a principle of democratic accountability, any governance process, such as consultations on 
proposed laws, should seek to hear and incorporate the views of those whose well-being is 
dependent on the issue being discussed (Van Rooy 2004). In addition, such people should be 
able to help shape the agenda of issues being addressed. That “well-being” can be understood 
in terms of the enjoyment of basic human rights, as defined in the various international 
conventions. Some people might be negatively affected by a potential decision or action, but if 
their basic welfare is not dependent on this, then their voice would not add value to the 
democratic accountability of that political deliberation as much as the voice of those whose 
well-being is dependent on the issues being addressed. In a negotiation on drug patents and 
trade law, for instance, both people living with HIV and shareholders in pharmaceutical 
companies could be negatively affected by decisions, but the well-being and basic rights of the 
former are more dependently affected by any decisions made. This “dependent affectedness” is 
a key basis for the validity of a voice in a political deliberation. 
 
It is unusual for either individuals with HIV or shareholders to speak at such negotiations on 
the topic of their own affectedness. Instead, groups of people with common interests are 
represented by proxies, such as directors of organizations. Consequently, the accountability of a 
speaker to those who are dependently affected by the matters being discussed is key, as well as 
the number of people giving the speaker that mandate—for example, the number of members 
(Van Rooy 2004). Accountability to members does not indicate the validity if speaking about 
issues that do not affect the membership. For example, that development NGOs “may have a 
million members in rich countries says nothing about their competence to speak for the poor” in 
the South (Clark 2003:173). 
 
All of the civic networks profiled in this paper communicated as if they represented the persons 
affected by the issues being addressed, or ignored, by policy makers. In the case of SIN and 
PWYP, this was true to a degree. However, as discussed earlier, the British NGOs in CORE and 
TJM had limited connection with Southern constituencies and focused those relations on 
generating material to back up their campaigning. Survey respondents identified Southern 
NGO participation as the most important constituency to engage in future. A lack of Southern 
NGO participation limits the legitimacy of the networks on the basis of their accountability to 
intended beneficiaries. 
 
Accountability to the intended beneficiaries of an NGO’s advocacy is, however, only one means 
for the legitimacy of their advocacy. For some issues, the intended beneficiaries are constantly 
changing, silenced, not born yet, or not even human. Organizations working on housing issues 
may find that those they work for are constantly moving in and out of their housing. Those 
working for victims of torture may not be able to communicate with them directly. Those 
working for future generations cannot take their counsel. Neither can those working for animals 
or entire ecologies, nor those working for all life on Earth. Accountability to those directly 
involved in the matters at hand, such as homeless people, relatives of the imprisoned, mothers, 
those affected by pollution, or peoples who place certain value in environmental phenomena, is 
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one means by which a voice can become valid for deliberation on those issues, but there are 
other bases for the validity of voice.  
 
The second basis for the validity of a voice is the relevant experience of a person or 
organization. If an organization works on child welfare then its experience of child welfare 
promotion makes its opinions on this issue worth hearing. The UK government requires that 
charities base their advocacy on their experiences on the matters they advocate on. This poses a 
challenge for NGOs working on an economic inequality and justice agenda. For example, a 
development NGO may have no “experience” of currency trading and tax management, yet 
these processes damage economies and state budgets in ways that then impact on development 
possibilities. The civic networks studied here did enable the exchange of experiences and the 
articulation of the common economic drivers of the diverse problems that the NGOs were 
working on. However, the lack of racial, regional and class diversity in the networks, with 96 
per cent of respondents considering themselves Caucasian, 88.5 per cent considering themselves 
middle class and the same percentage having lived the majority of their childhood in the West, 
indicates that the experience of these professionals and their organizations is of limited 
diversity. This limitation to relevant experience compounds the problem of the limited 
accountability identified above, and indicates that the networks are comprised of people from 
the world’s elites. 
 
The third basis for the validity of a voice is expertise. For example, most development NGOs 
claim to have knowledge of the lives of the poor and the reasons shaping their situation. Alison 
Van Roy (2004) has noted how the information provided by some NGOs on public policy 
deliberations are sometimes unavailable through other means. The novelty or effectiveness of 
knowledge is not, however, the only basis for claiming expertise, and issues of research 
methodology are important. At times all the civic networks mentioned their expertise, rather 
than experience or mandate from beneficiaries, to back up their claims. The networks did not, 
however, involve universities and, as resources were limited, they did not conduct much of 
their own primary research on the matters being addressed and none that was anonymously 
peer reviewed. The highest on the list of the seven strategic priority areas of work for 2006–2010 
identified by CORE participants was “providing proof of the case”, which illustrated their own 
sense of the need to build this dimension to their legitimacy (CORE 2006). 
 
A fourth basis for the quality of a voice arises from the content of what is being expressed. 
When a voice is raised in defence of processes of accountability and democracy, it should be 
responded to as deliberations are founded on such values they provide the context for voices to 
be valued in the ways described above. Expressing commitment to non-violence, and 
reminding people of internationally agreed principles of human rights, are aspects of what 
some call the moral authority of an opinion (Van Rooy 2004). Groups like Human Rights Watch, 
the International Crisis Group and the International Commission of Jurists have no mass 
memberships, and often limited experience of abuses in the field. They often have expert 
knowledge of national and international human rights law, but much of the veracity of their 
voice arises from their recourse to principles of fundamental and universal human rights. 
Aspects of the advocacy claims of the civic networks studied did focus on basic concepts of 
human rights and the importance of democratic processes. However, as they went beyond that 
into recommendations on specific policies and laws, so moral authority is not a basis for the 
validity of their advocacy. 
 
Michael Edwards (2003:1) reminds us that “those who speak out do not need to be formally 
representative of a constituency”. Free speech is a fundamental tenet of democracy. This means 
that a voice can be valued merely by its novelty, especially if none of the aforementioned 
aspects apply to it. If a viewpoint has not been heard before in a political deliberation and is 
said to be shared by a part of society, then it has a certain quality for that deliberation. Novel 
opinions that claim to relate to a constituency of opinion and are not in contravention of basic 
human rights principles should be welcomed, and then invited to attain a validity based on the 
factors previously mentioned. Views soon lose their novelty once expressed, and so in time the 
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validity of voice would depend on accountability, experience, expertise or content. As the civic 
networks studied here did not put forward novel views, this was not a basis for the legitimacy 
of their policy advocacy. 
As the civic networks can not claim validity on the basis of either novelty or content, their 
accountability, expertise and experience are central to their legitimacy as policy advocates. 
These factors appeared to be confused by many involved in the networks and policy processes. 
Some of the networks did not actively seek to develop these grounds for their legitimacy, 
whether through greater Southern NGO engagement, methodologically sound research, or a 
more systematic gathering and sharing of relevant experiences. The reason for this appears to 
be the limited resources available, both to the network and to the participants for their network-
related activities. 
Shifting Network Strategies 
This study was conducted with an interest in identifying how NGOs could effect economic 
policy changes that would result in reducing global inequalities. Therefore part of the aim was 
to identify some implications of the analysis for NGO and network strategy. A number of 
studies of activism and social movements have found that national histories are key to shaping 
both discourse and action (della Porta and Diani 2006). This suggests that the autonomy of civic 
society is limited, and the advocacy goals of NGOs may be produced as much by the interests of 
national governments and business than a self-generated analysis of the situation by NGOs. To 
help reduce the likelihood of merely repeating such historically determined positions on policy 
issues, NGOs and their networks could make efforts to systematically develop and evaluate 
their social change strategies, with insight from persons outside their particular national 
experience. This section discusses the extent to which such strategic planning and evaluation 
took place, in light of the promises of networks identified from network science, and make 
some initial recommendations for strategic shifts in mindsets that might better effect policy 
change to reduce global inequalities.  
 
Sixty per cent of NGO survey respondents do not have a documented, overarching analysis of 
social change and how to affect it, either at the organizational or departmental level. The 
majority of the respondents have not had independent evaluation of their advocacy work. This 
lack of clarity on strategy and absence of thorough processes of evaluation and learning means 
that core questions about assumptions, values and politics are not explored. On the positive 
side, this allows the participants in networks to work together with differing perspectives, 
rather than spending scarce time and resources trying to negotiate on first principles. However, 
this also means that opportunities for greater cohesion and advocating a coherent agenda are 
lost. Instead, the unity of participants emerges through reacting to public policy processes, 
particularly in opposing policies. Similar to the global justice movement, where the phrase “one 
no and many yeses” is prevalent, this approach means that the types of “yes” are not often 
agreed upon and campaigning remains largely reactive. A key step in changing this situation 
would be for civic networks and their participants to decide to learn about how to develop, 
evaluate and adapt social change strategies. A related point would be to decide some common 
principles for society and economy for NGOs’ participation in public policy processes, how 
networks can function well, and thus imagine a model of excellence for the network that can be 
worked toward. Some key aspects of this shift to more strategic mobilization through networks 
are discussed below.  
 
The strategic shift for more effective civic networks suggests a more deliberate identity-creating 
strategy. Currently the networks do not seek to educate their members or shape a common 
identity. The lack of a cohering approach means that a civic networks advocacy can appear like 
a laundry list of issues and demands that reflect a compromise between participants. To 
elaborate a more coherent agenda would require greater investment in participants learning 
about the common determinants of the problems the different NGOs campaign on. Although 
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this can be time-consuming, given that identity shaping is key to both networks and social 
movements, a more deliberate effort on this could prove effective. One benefit is that it could 
enable the network and its participants to better consider complex challenges, such as their 
relations with the private and financial sector. 
Another aspect of the strategic shift is to evolve the way participants think of themselves and 
the network in relation to society and social movements. Currently many of the NGO 
participants have an organization-centric and charity mentality to their work. By organization 
centric, we mean that they focus primarily on how their interactions in the network and beyond 
can meet the needs of their organization. That may be understandable and inevitable, but it 
means that the full benefits of networks and participation in social movements is limited. This is 
particularly so in terms of role differentiation and coordination within networks to enable 
insider strategies involving collaboration with elites, and outsider strategies involving 
confrontation with them, to synergize rather than undermine each other. To achieve such 
differentiations and coordination requires NGO participants in networks to see the networks as 
a whole and how they can play a needed role within it.  
 
The term charity mentality means that NGOs approach issues in a way that asks people to help 
others through an appeal to their morality. This may sound both reasonable and positive but it 
presents a number of limitations. First, it means that the process of asking and the process of 
giving are seen to have value in their own right, for those doing the asking and giving, and this 
can sustain arrangements whether they are successful or not, as they provide an emotional 
benefit for the donor and the charity worker. Second, it ensures that the work agendas are 
shaped to a degree by the forms of awareness and interest of donors. Third, it creates a sense of 
otherness between the needy and those who help them. Fourth, it limits the view of how social 
change occurs, and how much, to that which can be funded by voluntary giving.  
 
One result of this approach is the view many NGO participants express about the difficulty of 
persuading donors to invest in their work on economic justice, and that they need such money 
to “raise awareness” and “campaign”. However, the idea that issues of economic injustice are 
being experienced by people every day, all over the world should guide us into exploring how 
such people are currently seeking to rectify that situation, and the tools that are—or are not—at 
their disposal. This, in turn, could inform interventions that would service their needs in 
solidarity with them without relying on persuading large donors or powerful institutions to act 
out of moral concern. Projects that might evolve out of such an approach could include the 
creation of new mechanisms for legal support, or systems for channelling the experiences of 
intended beneficiaries into the risk assessments of financial institutions.  
 
Another aspect of this strategic shift toward a movement mentality is that network conveners 
and participants could not only better recognize the limits of what they could achieve 
themselves through the network, but ensure that they address those limitations by relating 
effectively to other processes in the movement. A key limitation found in the research was the 
networks’ relationship to business and finance. The importance of business interests in shaping 
policy outcomes was widely recognized, and the majority of civic network participants were 
aware of some companies or business people sharing the analysis and some of the policy 
recommendations of the network. This reflects a growing recognition in the field of corporate 
responsibility that many business people are supportive of a transformation of the current 
economic system, and can be regarded as constituting a “corporate responsibility movement” 
(Bendell et al. 2009). Greater engagement with business was discussed on a number of occasions 
by network participants, such as the one-day workshop at CORE (2006), but without much 
success. One reason is that most NGO respondents considered that such engagements would 
present difficult issues for the network, including concerns about co-optation, as well as 
undermining the trust certain constituencies had in the network. Present analysis of NGO 
engagement with business in multistakeholder networks does highlight a range of 
organizational and political challenges (Bendell 2000; Waddell 2005). One method for 
addressing these concerns would be for a network to enable its participants to engage in 
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communities of common interest with relevant business persons, and to facilitate plurilateral 
collaborations between those businesses and NGOs that are able to take joint action.  
 
Another limitation on networks is how “radical” their member NGOs could be seen to be by 
donors, NGO boards, media or government regulators. The strategic implication is that the civic 
networks could facilitate more informal interactions between members and more grassroots 
campaigners who are not network members, so that activities could be better coordinated when 
appropriate. With a movement mentality, such fluid collaborations with individuals in a variety 
of sectors may be more easily envisaged and organized. 
 
The strategic shift for more effective civic networks must also involve a move from focusing on 
corporations to focusing on their owners. As discussed above, effective networks should help 
participants identify common cause and learn about common determinants of the challenges 
they face. The financial system is one such commonality. Networks should also allow for the 
pooling of resources between participants in ways that enable a new level of specialist 
knowledge and action. The financial services sector is so complex that it is difficult for NGOs to 
have specialists in this field that are also specialists in the NGOs’ area of interest.  
 
Those NGOs that have done some work on finance have focused on either project finance, 
which is only about 1 per cent of global finance, or on ranking the high street banks’ 
incorporation of social and environmental issues into their wider lending practices. Yet in terms 
of the effects on inequality, the financial system had been in crisis for over ten years before the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank. The problematic practices of financial 
services in areas, such as currency speculation, offshore trusts, short selling and leveraged 
buyouts, have not been engaged by most mainstream NGOs in the United Kingdom. There 
could be two reasons for this. First is the brain drain from British NGOs into the professions of 
socially responsible investment and corporate responsibility management or consulting. Many 
of the leading professionals in the responsible finance sector came from NGOs. Second is the 
institutionalization of NGOs, so they become less innovative and more risk averse over time. 
Convincing the membership of the NGOs that, for instance, currency speculation should be 
curbed to promote sustainable development is more of a challenge than convincing them that a 
fence should be put around a forest to protect a bird. Given climate change, which driven by 
dynamics of global finance, the latter may be increasingly futile, but it is still an easier 
communications option and therefore an easier fundraising message. Even with the various 
limitations suggested here, civic networks could play a role in advancing and working on 
financial services. PWYP started as a campaign on financial services regulation and could 
reinvigorate that focus. TJM grew out of a prior campaign on financial issues, concerning poor 
country debt cancellation and could extend its current focus to work on the private financial 
dimension to trade justice. Given the rise of resource nationalism, SIN and other actors involved 
in oil industry campaigning could also increase their work on the financing of oil and gas. 
CORE could also examine how the new regulations apply to financial institutions, which are, of 
course, also corporations. All these networks could help their members to consider how they 
manage their own investments, to ensure they are not invested in ways that undermine 
economic justice. 
The challenge facing all network conveners and participants in being more strategic with 
planning and evaluation is that of resources. Work on economic inequality and justice is 
marginal to most UK NGOs. This is reflected in the limited profile economic justice issues have 
in the member and media communications of many of the NGO participants in the networks 
studied. This is also demonstrated by the budget allocations for this type of advocacy. One 
participant in CORE, for instance, was donating 0.0002 per cent of its annual expenditure to that 
network, which when staff time was included, amounted to only about 0.0005 per cent of the 
organization’s expenditure. The marginal nature of these issues to the mainstream NGOs means 
that the NGOs’ own projects and campaigns on economic justice issues are conservative in 
agenda, tone and profile. Those working on economic justice are often marginal to mainstream 
strategy, policy, budgetary and staffing decisions in their organizations. As one participant 
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from a mainstream NGO explained: “not everyone [in my NGO] would realize the extent to 
which we do work in that network—they don’t see how many emails we exchange every day. 
They’re not really party to the conversations that go on, they just see the results.” The people 
working on economic justice issues in such NGOs have been connecting through civic networks 
as a means of coping with a comparative lack of organizational commitment and backing for 
such issues. It could be said the civic networks are coping mechanisms by activists working in 
co-opted or conservative organizations. There are some exceptions; for example, Friends of 
Earth decided to make corporate campaigns a focus during the early years of the twenty-first 
century. However, even that level of commitment is subject to the vagaries of institutional 
interests of an NGO. In the case of FoE, in 2007 it decided to downscale its corporate work and 
focus more on clearly environmental issues, given the rise in environmental awareness in the 
wake of growing climate concerns. Without secure and substantial financial and institutional 
backing, opportunities are missed and problems arise for the networks, as described in this 
paper. For instance, they are not engaged with either beneficiaries or grassroots activists as 
much as they might be, or should be, to be legitimate, informed and effective. Neither are the 
conveners or participants able to afford necessary processes of strategic planning, evaluation 
and project experimentation.  
 
The break of the financial crisis in 2008, after the study was completed, highlights the 
limitations of the NGO strategies examined. Whereas organizational self-interests held most 
NGOs back from pursuing a comprehensive economic justice agenda that incorporated 
financial justice, the resultant lack of attention to finance did nothing to curb the excesses that 
led to crisis and a consequent decline in NGO funding, due to the economic difficulties facing 
the public, governments and charitable foundations. The double irony may be if NGOs’ 
economic work is scaled back at a time of resource constraints, because it is seen as peripheral 
to core activities, and unlikely to win interest from hard pressed business leaders or 
government officials. Ultimately it comes down to money.  
 
Civic networks and their participants will not be able to be more effective on economic justice 
issues without tackling the root cause of the resource scarcity they face. Therefore the strategic 
shift toward more network excellence must include looking at how to influence the NGO 
participants’ own organizational development so they might engage more fully in economic 
justice issues, social movements and civic networks. The challenge is to work through networks 
to help transform the organizations that form the networks, so they might all better enable 
social change. A range of activities could help to implement such an approach, such as engaging 
the CEOs of the NGO participants that are most open to exploring the organizational 
development implications of the political economic dimensions of the issues they work on. A 
key barrier to overcome will be the NGOs’ concern for brand and resource protection, which 
can stifle innovation in projects and messaging. 
From Noble to Global 
Earlier analyses of NGO advocacy have raised “serious doubts regarding how far NGOs in the 
North are able to do anything that is especially alternative to their host countries’ bilateral aid 
programmes” (Bebbington et al. 2008:3–4). That analysis suggests that development NGOs have 
become part of an institutionalized business of aid provision with close ties to the bilateral and 
multilateral development establishment, and in the process not only paid disproportionate 
attention to service delivery but also failed to build links with organizations more connected to 
peoples’ movements. Consequently they are seen to promote a conservative and reformist 
agenda, as opposed to one that is more transformative by advocating economic justice and 
redistribution as well as promoting alternative forms of development (Bebbington et al. 2008). 
NGOs are criticized from this perspective as being well-meaning yet fundamentally inert elites, 
who do little to address the scale of the challenges faced.  
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The case studies of civic networks face some similar challenges, in terms of the limited impact 
on public policy processes, and the limited role of the networks and NGOs in people’s daily 
struggles against unequal power relations. The term “noble” usefully describes different aspects 
of these networks as they existed during the early years of the twenty-first century. Its 
etymology is the Latin “nobilis” which means well-known. The Encarta definition of noble 
comprised five dimensions: having excellent moral character—possessing high ideals or 
excellent moral character; aristocratic—belonging or relating to an aristocratic social or political 
class; relating to high moral principles—based on high ideals or revealing excellent moral 
character; magnificent—impressive in quality or appearance; and in chemistry, non-reactive: 
chemically inactive or inert. The civic networks studied here demonstrate something of each of 
these five aspects of this concept. “Noble networks” are networks with apparently noble 
objectives, that involve people whose relationship to their intended beneficiaries can put them 
in an elite position, and that are fairly inert in terms of their impact on society.  
 
Rather than being forces in a social movement that transform power relations in a society or the 
wider world, networks may be enabling the status quo by providing a place where educated, 
intellectual and ethically concerned people can convene and express this concern, without 
challenging power structures. The fact that many NGO professionals end up working in 
business or government highlights how they may be helping institutions to adapt and reform, 
rather than transforming them. Given the growing rates of global inequality and the role of 
economic and political power in shaping that inequality, it appears that UK civil society is far 
too civil and there is far too much “society”, in the elite socializing form of that term. In 
historical studies, the term noble networks has been used to describe trans-European elites of 
the past (Sandberg 2006). The contemporary forms of civic network are not powerful in this 
sense; in fact, they are far from it. However, this historic parallel highlights that, to be an agent 
of global equality, their challenge is both to embody democratic ideals themselves and secure 
them in global power structures, rather than creating new buffers around power structures.  
 
Our analysis has not covered other forms of civic organization, such as trade unions and 
grassroots community organizations. Networks of those organizations may or may not 
experience some of the opportunities and problems outlined in this paper. We conclude that 
civic networks similar to those examined here should move from being noble to global, in a 
range of different ways. An obvious way is to become more internationally connected, 
involving groups from around the world and seeking to influence actors and policies in 
different countries and at international forums, depending on the opportunities that arise. They 
can also become more global by espousing universal values as a way of articulating a common 
agenda rather than reacting to national government policy and donor interests. Another way 
would be by involving more diverse participants from different races, genders, places, sectors 
and classes, as well as ensuring that the networks are increasingly legitimate in what they say 
and do. They can become more global also through their notion of the person: to see how the 
processes that create problems for intended beneficiaries are the same processes that create 
problems for themselves, their organizations and even their donors. While charity will never be 
an inclusive global concept, solidarity can be. Networks could focus more on systems that are 
universal, particularly finance and entertainment media, which are the most global systems of 
power in the world today.  
 
Some of the activities that civic network conveners and participants could consider to catalyse 
this shift from noble to global were discussed in the previous section. The implications of this 
analysis for donors and for progressives in government and business are more complicated. 
Donors could explore how to enable Southern constituencies to advocate for themselves and 
shift policy-related funding away from Western groups and to the South. However, large donor 
attempts to influence civil society mobilization from below have been found at times to 
undermine existing legitimate channels that arise from local contexts (Mouffe 2005). Therefore a 
form of solidarity donorship may be required, where donors look to service the needs of 
peoples’ organizations in ways that do not require continued foreign intervention to succeed 
and that do not create new independent channels of resource flow and agenda setting. 
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Unfortunately the approach of the UK Department for International Development in giving far 
larger sums of funding to large UK–based NGOs may work against this and further undermine 
the ability of NGOs to work as social movement organizations. Given the role of large donors, 
particularly as part of governments, in maintaining the power structures that drive much 
inequality and injustice, more time should be spent on internal organizational change within 
the bureaucracies of government and intergovernmental institutions.  
Another area where large donors could support change on economic justice issues is to help 
professionals in business and finance who have left NGOs, yet work on related issues. Such 
people have become good technicians at particular aspects of the social and environmental 
performance of business and finance but are not able to create as much change as they might, 
due to limited time and mandates from their employers. The implications of this analysis for 
such people in the private sector is that they support and engage in more informal networks on 
these issues that cut across organizational sectors; seek to involve more civic society 
organizations in their own multi-enterprise associations; and support the training of NGOs in 
the North and South on matters of private finance.  
 
These recommendations all relate to a shift in mindset among professionals in NGOs, 
companies and donors, who are interested in pursuing an economic justice agenda. The shift is 
away from an organization-centric mindset to a movement-centric one, where an individual’s 
and their organizations’ role in strengthening a network’s impact becomes a priority (Bendell et 
al. 2009). The relationship of NGOs to social movements has been a difficult one, as processes of 
professionalization and donor interests have often led NGOs away from more systemic 
critiques of economic systems and processes of grassroots mobilizing to build counterveiling 
powers. In the United Kingdom, many mainstream NGOs have significant resources and 
profile, and so there is little need to join networks to work on their core mandates, unless they 
wish to address the systemic causes of the issues they focus on. An interesting question is 
whether such NGOs have the ambition and courage to work on a more transformative agenda 
and, if so, whether networks could bridge the gap between themselves and the wider public of 
active citizens and social movement adherents. 
 
Traditionally, the connection between professionals in the private sector and social movements 
has been even more tenuous, according to most studies, yet recent evidence suggests many 
business people are supportive of a more transformative economic agenda (Bendell et al. 2009). 
Therefore future research could focus on how social movement theories and network theories 
could inform efforts for economic justice that involve people from different organizational 
sectors. As a study at the interface of organization theory and social movement theory that is 
explicit in maintaining the spirit of social movement analysis, we have sought to respond to the 
call for more practical yet idealistic research (Scully and Creed 2005). Future research could 
focus on gathering information to further refine and elaborate the findings of this research to 
key opinion-forming and decision-making audiences, such as charitable foundations. Another 
approach would be to actually attempt some of the policy and strategy changes suggested by 
the conclusions, as a form of action research, and thus determine what works and what does 
not. Certainly we have found that more work is needed on what networks can and do achieve, 
and what their limitations are, in ways can that be useful for network conveners, participants 
and funders. We have only made initial steps in trying to bring network sciences to bear on 
analysis of NGO advocacy, and trying to incorporate insights on that from social movement 
theories: more work at the interface of social movement theories and organizational theories is 
required, while keeping a clear focus on the social purpose of such inquiry (Scully and Creed 
2005). 
Conclusion 
Global inequality and injustice remain intractable problems that also affect people in the United 
Kingdom, a country with a long tradition of international involvement. Although the political 
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power of civic society organizations in Western societies is widely reported as significant, and 
UK NGOs are particularly well-funded and vocal on international development issues, the 
study found that they have had a limited effect on public policies and reducing inequalities in 
the trade and corporate accountability areas. It found that many NGO staff work on such issues 
in inter-organizational networks, due to a lack of strategic commitment from their NGOs to 
tackle a justice and equality agenda head on. The study found that by working through 
networks, NGOs could exert more influence over public policy on global inequality. However, 
by comparing current practice with the promises of networks identified in the study of 
organizations and social movements, the research revealed that many of the potential benefits 
are not being systemically realized by network participants. This is a result of resource scarcity, 
which leads to a lack of investment in network learning and strategic planning, so the civic 
networks are not utilizing the network effect, attested to by various analysts, to its full extent. 
As a result their impacts may be limited and have unintended consequences, their activities 
may be driven by government agendas, their campaign aims may repeat existing political 
compromises and cultural norms, and their coalition building may be prematurely curtailed. 
Consequently these networks generate some concerns over legitimacy and effectiveness, 
appearing to some people as inert and elite clubs of intelligent civic professionals—noble 
networks. Such networks could be a mechanism for empowering agency within existing societal 
structures, but would likely require an enhanced effort to align participant organizations with 
network-related activities, and the involvement of more groups who shape inequality, as well 
as those who suffer from it. This analysis does not extend to other forms of civic organization, 
such as trade unions or grassroots community groups. Perhaps greater engagement with such 
groups would help the types of networks studied to address some of the issues described 
above. In addition, to enable network excellence, more research is required on the pitfalls of 
participation in networks.  
 
As the networks studied were fairly new, the limitations we point to could merely be the 
birthing pains of new forms of organizing that traverse boundaries of nation, sector and public 
concern. As experience grows and connections are made, the somewhat “noble” networks 
chronicled in this paper have the opportunity to become truly global forces for the common 
good. Given intensifying national and international inequalities and the violence that this 
situation can breed in communities across the world, it is an opportunity we hope they seize. 
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